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THE CREDENTIALS OF OUR COMMUNION

III.

In considering the credentials of our Communion, we began by a very brief examination of the attitude of the Anglican Church towards the creeds and conciliar definitions which have found general acceptance among Catholic Christians. From this we passed to an equally brief investigation of certain historical questions concerned rather with order than with faith, and we found in the ideas which characterized the conciliar movement of the fifteenth century what has been described as the "*raison d'être* of the Church of England as against ultramontanism on the one hand and individual Protestantism on the other." It remains to attempt in the present article some sort of theological justification for the position at which we had arrived, and we must endeavour at the outset to see if it be possible to obtain something like a guiding principle, something whereby we may test our results at each point. For this purpose we shall do well to go back to the great Christological controversies of the third and fourth centuries, the controversies concerning the person of Christ which engaged the attention of the Church from the Council of Nicea to the Council of Chalcedon. These resulted in a definition of faith to which reference has already been made. As against Nestorianism on the one hand, and Monophysitism on the other, bearing in mind the ingenious but unfortunate solution of the Christological problem which Apollinaris had attempted, the Church declared her belief in the complete humanity as well as in the complete divinity of our Lord, defining the co-existence of the two natures in the one Person. In doing this the Church took the hardest line, while the various heresies which she condemned were each in its own way a taking of the line of least resistance. Now on the maintenance of the faith of Chalcedon depends the integrity of Catholic Christianity, and in the dominant idea of the co-existence of the two natures—"unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably"—we may, I think, find the guiding principle for which

we are seeking. But although the Church has given its formal recognition to the Chalcedonian definition, the difficulties of that position are such that it has constantly shown a tendency to deflect from it. It may be asserted that Monophysitism, or the doctrine of the one nature in Christ, and that the Divine, never affected the West, yet it cannot be denied that in popular theology it has manifested itself again and again. It is only necessary to study certain types of devotional literature of the less careful kind, or to have had a certain amount of experience of practical teaching, in order to ascertain that many very devout persons among ourselves have, to say the least, quite an imperfect grasp of the doctrine of the two natures. It is obviously so much easier to adopt an implicitly Monophysite attitude, or when this is demonstrated as impossible to fall away in a Nestorian direction. The maintenance of the high standard of Chalcedonian orthodoxy is one of the most difficult tasks which has been imposed upon the Catholic Church, and the failure of any part of the Church to be faithful in this matter has at all times in history been fraught with disastrous consequences. Now if it be maintained that the Church and the Sacraments are the extension of the Incarnation, it is reasonable to expect that the guiding principle of the one will be applicable to the other. In other words, the doctrine of the two natures may not be confined to the person of Christ, but will be found to apply also to other departments of Christian belief. The examination of the question seems to show that the failure to apply this principle to the Scriptures, the Church, and the Sacraments has resulted in those controversies which have been the source of division in the Church. Let us now attempt to make such examination, though necessarily very briefly; and it will be best to begin by considering the doctrine of the Eucharist.

In the history of the doctrine of the Holy Eucharist, although it is easy to discover certain divergent tendencies of thought in comparatively early days, we find singularly little that is of a controversial nature. In the West, however, from the time of the Berengarian controversy onwards it becomes a matter of bitter dispute, and although in the later Middle Ages such controversy was to a large extent repressed by authority, it broke out again with almost unparalleled fierceness at the time of the Reformation. It is, of course, perfectly easy to see the difference between the Eucharistic doctrine of the Council of Trent, which accepts transubstantiation, and offers a presentation of the Eucharistic sacrifice which seems to find no place for the heavenly priesthood of our Lord, and that of Zwingli, which regards the Eucharist as a bare commemoration. It is not, however, equally easy to distinguish between the various shades of opinion that are to be found between these two extremes. Nevertheless, it is possible to ascertain the

real nature of the difficulty, and it may be found in the Nihilianistic tendencies of Western Eucharistic theology, which ultimately produced as a reaction the doctrine of the more extreme reformers. Nihilianism, like Monophysitism, is the line of least resistance. It is essentially the doctrine of the one nature, and that the Divine; and, further, it appears to imply a notion of destruction, which can find no counterpart either in the best presentment of Catholic doctrine or the most valid categories of modern thought. Again, let us take the question of transubstantiation. It may be argued that this does not in itself necessarily involve Nihilianism, but what it most certainly does involve is an explanation of one of the mysteries of the faith in terms of a particular philosophy—a philosophy, we may add, which would not find anything like general acceptance in modern times. On the other hand, if we take the Zwinglian doctrine of the Eucharist, it may be said with quite equal truth that we have another example of the line of least resistance, and the doctrine of the one nature only. If these contentions be correct, it will be seen that the great Eucharistic controversies have arisen from two causes: (1) The failure to maintain the doctrine of the two natures, and (2) the making *de fide* of the explanation of a dogma in the terms of a particular philosophy. Can it be said that the Anglican Church at the time of the Reformation settlement avoided both these errors? It certainly repudiated transubstantiation, and while it avoided minute definition on the subject, the best explanation of its formularies which can be offered is one which is only strictly compatible with the doctrine of the two natures. Neither Nihilianism nor transubstantiation can be justified by the language of the Liturgy, the Catechism, or the Articles, but it is equally clear that Zwinglianism, Calvinism, and Lutheranism are excluded. We are left with that ancient Catholic belief in the real and objective presence or activity of our Lord in the Eucharistic sacrifice expressed in the terms of no particular philosophy, and capable of explication in terms of modern thought.

Something was said in the first of these articles with regard to the attitude of our Communion as to the inspiration of Scripture, and as to the manner in which it has been capable of assimilating the results of modern criticism. This is also due to her recognition of the doctrine of the two natures. The mechanical theory of verbal inspiration on the one hand, and the modern sceptical outlook which reduces Holy Scripture to the level of ordinary secular literature, equally repudiate the doctrine of the two natures. The frank recognition of the human and Divine elements co-existing side by side alone makes it possible to evolve a doctrine of Holy Scripture which is consistent with a reasonable theory of development, and while maintaining at the highest possible spiritual level the

character of the Divine message, does not hesitate to recognize the necessary and fallible human element. From the person of our Lord, the doctrine of the Holy Eucharist, and the inspiration of Scripture, we pass naturally to the doctrine of the Church. The question with which we are mainly concerned in this connection is that of guidance and infallibility. Man is naturally impatient of uncertainty, especially in matters which are admittedly of great moment. He seeks for infallibility of guidance. Whence may it be had? Further, the Christian possesses a Scriptural assurance of the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Whence may this be obtained, and how may it be recognized? Again, it may be convenient to consider the two extremes—the doctrine of Papal infallibility, and its Protestant correlative of individual assurance based on a non-authoritative interpretation of verbally inspired Scripture. Papal infallibility is admittedly a doctrine of very modern growth. Defined as a matter of faith only fifty years ago, and even then failing to obtain the assent of some of the most distinguished theologians of the Latin Communion, the definition itself was the final outcome of that struggle between Pope and Council which we considered in the previous article. Plainly it is Monophysite. No scope is left for the human and fallible element. However safeguarded, it becomes in the last resort mechanical. Apart from the fact that the historical difficulties surrounding it are insuperable, it fails to commend itself on other grounds, and has in it an element of apotheosis which is clearly discernible in the debates of the Vatican Council. Once more it presents the line of least resistance. Yet it may be doubted whether it is open to more serious objections than those which may be raised against its Protestant counterpart, though it is far more difficult to define the latter than the former. One possible merit, however, of the Papal system—viz., that of unity and conformity—is obviously lacking in Protestantism. The spectacle of innumerable and conflicting interpretations of a verbally inspired Scripture will commend itself to nobody, and the chaos involved in conflicting systems of Protestant doctrine has manifested itself in succeeding ages in almost innumerable sects and subdivisions. Are we then driven back on the theory of an infallible council as the one possible source of certain guidance? To this theory many of the Anglican divines, and especially those of the Oxford Movement, have given their adherence; yet if such a theory be accepted, it must be with caution and reserve, and with a due sense of the importance of the lessons which may be learned from history. It is possible to hold a mechanical theory of councils which is itself of a Monophysite character, and is open to many of the objections which attach themselves to the theory of Papal infallibility. Let us see if this can be avoided.

In the first place, it seems necessary frankly to admit the existence of the human element, and the possibility that this human element will to a certain extent counteract the measure of Divine guidance vouchsafed. Thus, if the contentions of the last article be correct, the guidance granted to the councils of the fifteenth century was primarily manifested, not in that which they accomplished, but rather in that which they failed to accomplish. The reason for their failure consisted to a large extent in the personal defects of those who constituted these assemblies. The Holy Spirit pointed in one direction; motives of self-interest and other things not less unworthy drove them in another. In other words, the Divine guidance was thwarted by the human element; therefore, we are justified in concluding that exactly where they failed, under favourable circumstances we might succeed. The ideals before them were not things of a moment, but things for all time. Those ideals were rejected by the Latin Church, which in its subsequent development has gone farther and farther from them. They were, however, implicit in the Reformation settlement of the Anglican Church, and have never been absent, in spite of many vicissitudes, from the fundamental ideas of the Orthodox Church of the East. They are as the leaven working in the lump. The tendencies of modern thought and historical investigation have brought them once more to the fore, and in the providence of God they may find their realization in the not very remote future. It is promised that the Holy Spirit shall guide the Church into all truth. It is not, however, promised that the whole Church or any part of it shall have attained to that truth at any particular moment in time. Yet the matter of really vital importance is that we can be assured that the direction which the Church, or any part of it, is taking is the right one—that is to say, the one which will ultimately lead towards that final attainment of truth in its fulness and completeness.

Now the real fundamental difficulty is that it is so very hard to obtain anything like a true historical perspective. We have been reminded, and wisely, that Christianity is still a very young religion, and in this connection we should remember that the materials for writing anything like a complete history of the Church since its foundation are only gradually being amassed. The lessons, further, of Church history are so often rather negative than positive. It is far easier to ascertain what is to be avoided than what is to be followed after. Yet if we are able to ascertain with any degree of certainty the fundamental causes of serious error, and to find that in any particular part of the Church something at least has been done to strike at the root of these causes, we may reasonably assume that if it be faithful to its tradition this particular part of the Church has an important rôle to play in the future. This is exactly our

contention with regard to the Anglican Communion, and the fundamental principle of her theology, if rightly understood, is the application of the Chalcedonian doctrine of the two natures, not only to the person of our Lord, but also to the Scriptures, the Church, and the Sacraments. This is not, however, to say that the Anglican Church is free from all error, and has committed no mistakes, nor does it imply that the Reformation settlement in this country was anything like ideal. Mistakes have clearly been made; things have fallen into disuse which are only latterly emerging into anything like general acceptance. Narrowness and insularity, intolerance and scepticism, have been the tares that have grown up along with the wheat. Nevertheless, great possibilities are discernible, and the actualization of those possibilities remains with those to whom has been entrusted the charge of defending and maintaining the Anglican position. Faithful to the ancient creeds and definitions of the Church, maintaining unimpaired the historic ministry, possessing a doctrine of Scripture which enables her to make use of the results of modern criticism, and a doctrine of the Church which is compatible with historic investigation, looking with full assurance to Divine guidance, yet avoiding any mechanical or Monophysite theory of the working of the Spirit, the Anglican Communion may look forward to playing no small part in the Divinely appointed mission of the Catholic Church.

We live in an age which is frankly intolerant of compromise, and for this very reason the Anglican position has in recent years been subjected to much hostile criticism. There are some among ourselves who appear to be altogether in favour of bringing both the doctrine and practice of the Church of England completely into line with the most recent developments of Latin Christianity. On the other hand, there are some who would make common cause with Protestantism, being themselves both impatient of doctrinal definition and indifferent to the essentials of Catholic order, which the Anglican Communion has always been at pains to defend. To both of these parties the Reformation settlement is equally distasteful. It may therefore be well, in conclusion, briefly to examine some of their reasons for considering it unsatisfactory. In detail no doubt it is unsatisfactory, but our contention is that its principles are thoroughly sound, and, further, we may add, are capable of development in the light of modern knowledge in a way that will lead to more satisfactory results than either of the systems which their opponents would prefer to adopt. The proof of this lies in three hundred years of history. That anything like an ideal settlement should have been reached in the sixteenth century, in view of the limitations of the knowledge then possessed, and of

the strenuous and exciting character of the epoch, is in itself intrinsically improbable; but that certain principles should have been evolved capable of subsequent development is not in itself impossible, and can, we think, be reasonably maintained. There is a school of thought nowadays which, with an entire disregard of history, appears to consider that the Middle Ages represent the ideal of religious belief and practice. This is in itself absolutely absurd. Even from the Latin point of view it cannot be maintained, otherwise the reforms of the Council of Trent, which were not inconsiderable, would have been entirely superfluous.

Let us examine certain points on which the English reformers took a somewhat drastic line. They removed from the public formularies of the Church all explicit prayer for the departed. It is, of course, difficult, if not quite impossible, to defend this action, yet no one who is acquainted with the facts can possibly deny that this department of Christian devotion was in urgent need of drastic reform. Yet the practice of prayer for the departed is nowhere condemned by the Anglican formularies, and the way has been left open for the reinsertion of those prayers in the public worship of the Church, a task which has just been undertaken by those in authority. From this we may turn to the question of invocation of saints, a matter which has been hotly disputed in recent times. Here, again, the use of invocation was removed from all formulæ, and the only reference to the practice of invocation in the Articles is so vague, and even probably intentionally ambiguous, as to leave the whole matter an open question. There is probably no department of doctrine or practice in which greater corruption had arisen during the Middle Ages than in that of the cultus of the saints. The Tridentine reformers had something to say about this matter, though probably not enough. Let us compare what has happened in the Anglican and in the Latin Communions. In the latter, it is not perhaps too much to say that things have gone from bad to worse. The fact that Alphonsus Liguori, author of the famous *Glories of Mary*, was raised by Pius IX. to the dignity of a doctor of the Church will speak for itself. Such developments as the cultus of St. Joseph are equally significant, and no sober-minded theologian can fail to regard with great apprehension the present position of the *cultus sanctorum*, both popular and official, in the Latin Communion. The Anglican Church has left the matter in such a way as to be capable of restatement. Its prayers and its Kalendar testify to the reality of its belief in the Communion of Saints as a real and essential part of the Catholic faith. Its official doctrine and practice in this regard may be considered as undeveloped, but even if this be so, it is surely in a better position than it was before the Reformation in this matter; and it may be added

that any future developments should be made carefully and consciously, with a full sense of responsibility and a clear knowledge of the serious dangers which have attended developments of the cult in other parts of the Church. It would be easy to multiply illustrations, but the general principle which emerges upon consideration of these facts appears to be that the Reformation settlement, while frankly admitting abuses and somewhat ruthlessly lopping off what it regarded as excrescences, yet committed itself to no principles which would hinder a normal and healthy development. No doors were closed, no ways stopped up. In one particular it is true the Reformation settlement appears to have been final, and that is with regard to her attitude towards the Papal supremacy. Subsequent events have surely justified her in this, and her firm and uncompromising attitude on this point has left the way open for that reunion with the Orthodox Church of the East which is to be so highly desired. If, however, this union is to be accomplished, she must remain steadfast and faithful to her characteristic attitude towards questions of faith and order, and the greatest danger in this respect is to be feared from those who are attracted by reunion with Protestant bodies, and are prepared to minimize the value of these principles. Should the counsels of this minority prevail, all that the Church of England has stood for from the time of the Reformation would be undone, and the one consistent witness to the principles of the conciliar movement of the fifteenth century would have ceased to exist. It is perhaps easy to exaggerate this danger. It is, however, perhaps better to do this than to underestimate it.

In conclusion, it may be urged that the spirit of freedom and toleration which has been fostered within the Anglican Communion, though open to criticism, has played no small part in the results we have been considering. The maintenance of a high standard of public opinion has done more to encourage fidelity than any degree of coercive discipline or ecclesiastical persecution could ever have produced, and it is perhaps fair to add that on the whole the Anglican Communion has been more free from the reproach of political intrigue than most other religious bodies. The ethics of religious persecution and ecclesiastical politics present many complicated problems, yet it can scarcely be denied that the results of these activities have been almost entirely for evil. A great Russian writer has presented us with a philosophy of Church history in the form of a parable which runs something as follows. I quote it from Dr. Temple's book, *Church and Nation*. It relates how that in the days of the Inquisition our Lord visited a city where it was at work. He moved about among men, causing them to forget their sorrows, healing the sick and curing diseases, and, meeting a funeral procession where a mother was mourning her only son, He restored the

boy to life. This act was performed in the Cathedral Square, and at that moment there came from the cathedral the Grand Inquisitor, a man of over ninety years, who had but the day before condemned many heretics to the stake. Seeing what was done, the Inquisitor gave the order to his attendants, "Arrest Him!" and the Prisoner was conveyed to the dungeon. That night the Inquisitor visited the Prisoner in the cell, and spake as follows: "I know why Thou art come; Thou art come to spoil our work, to repeat Thy great mistake in the wilderness, and to give men again Thy fatal gift of freedom. What did the great wise spirit offer Thee there? Just the three things by which men may be controlled—bread, and authority, and mystery. He bade Thee take bread as the instrument of Thy work—men will follow one who gives them bread—but Thou wouldest not; men were to follow Thee out of love and devotion, or not at all. We have had to correct Thy work, or there would be few to follow Thee. He bade Thee assume authority—men will obey one who gives command and punishes the disobedient—but Thou wouldest not; men were to obey out of love and devotion, or not at all. We have had to correct Thy work, or there would be few to obey Thee. He bade Thee show some marvel that men might be persuaded and believe. But Thou wouldest not; men were to believe from perception of Thy grace and truth, or not at all. We have had to correct Thy work and hedge Thee about with mystery, or there would be few to believe. And which of us has served mankind the better? Thy appeal was to the few strong souls. We have cared for the weak. Many who would be disorderly and miserable have been made orderly and happy. And now Thou art come to spoil our work and repeat Thy great mistake in the wilderness by giving to men again Thy fatal gift of freedom through trust in the power of love. But it shall not be, for to-morrow I shall burn Thee."

It will scarcely be denied that this parable is a work of genius. It contains very obviously a whole philosophy of Church history. The records of any part of the Church at any given period may be brought to it as to a touchstone. May it not be contended that if this test be applied to the Anglican Church, she will bear it at least as well as any other part of Christ's Church militant here on earth?

H. Leonard Pass.

THE RELATION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY*

By medieval writers, and still by orthodox Roman Catholics and Protestants of the more rigid type, a very definite distinction is drawn between theology and philosophy. Philosophy is largely occupied, indeed, with the same subject-matter as theology. It discusses the nature of the universe at large, the nature of God and His relation to the world, the nature of the human soul and its relation to God. All these things are also dealt with by theology. But philosophy investigates these things without presuppositions or assumptions. Its data are the observable facts of nature and of human psychology; its methods are the methods of reason and not those of authority. Or if in the scholastic philosophy the premisses were in point of fact taken very largely from authority, the authorities appealed to were the philosophers, especially Aristotle, "*the* philosopher" *par excellence;* but it was always assumed that the authority of Aristotle was ultimately based upon the fact that the main principles of his system had commended themselves to the reason of the world. On the other hand, in theology, while the conclusions of a rational philosophy were presupposed, the further premisses of the science were avowedly taken on trust from authority —the authority of the Bible, the Fathers, the Councils, various organs of Church authority; and in the last resort the truth of these premisses was supposed to be guaranteed by revelation—revelation conceived of as an actual communication of propositions (some of them already ascertainable by the proper exercise of human reason, others going quite beyond any truth which the unassisted human reason could reach) to particular persons at some definite moment of history. And the reliability of these authorities rested largely—though the point was, perhaps, not insisted upon in the scholastic period so emphatically and exclusively as in eighteenth-century apologetics—upon the attestation of miracles.

Now I shall assume that for us this hard-and-fast distinction between revealed and unrevealed truth has become impossible. We do not believe in an infallible book or an infallible Church. I need hardly say that this statement does not prevent our attaching much weight to authority of various kinds and in various senses; but the more enlightened among those modern theologians who attach the greatest weight to the authority of the Church do not usually contend that the authority which can be claimed by the Church, or any organ of Church authority, ever amounts to actual infallibility.

* An introductory address to the Oxford Summer School of Theology, 1920.

That is so, for instance, with Professor Stanton, one of the few modern writers who has really attempted any systematic defence of the principle of authority.* And that being so, the hard-and-fast distinction between revealed and unrevealed truth breaks down. Even the believer in the plenary revelation contained in certain books or in the utterances of certain authorities did not (if he were wise), or at all events he will not now, deny some measure of revelation or inspiration to the teaching of ancient philosophers, of non-Christian and non-Jewish religious writings, of modern teachers not technically regarded as inspired. Still less will that be the attitude of those who have parted company altogether with the idea of a plenarily inspired Bible or Church. On the other hand, the revelation or inspiration which we do believe in will not involve the acceptance upon trust of the bare *ipse dixit* of any definite book or historic personality or Church authority. If there are some not unphilosophical theologians who would be disposed to make such a claim for the utterances of the one historical personality, Jesus Christ, it would only be within a very restricted sphere that they would regard those utterances as infallible; and they would (with more or less definiteness and consistency) be disposed to base the authority which they claim for any particular utterance upon the appeal which His teaching as a whole makes to the reason and conscience of mankind.

I do not propose to discuss this question of the amount or the kind of inerrancy which can be claimed for the utterances of Christ considered simply as pronouncements of an external authority. For myself, there is one simple consideration which would always prevent my so regarding any saying attributed to Christ. In the present state of criticism we never can be sufficiently certain that any *isolated* saying of the Gospels was actually uttered by Jesus, and was intended by Him to be taken literally, to permit of our thinking it reasonable to believe what would otherwise strike us as incredible or highly improbable, or to act upon a precept which would otherwise seem to be immoral, simply on account of the historical evidence that the saying was His; while, if we think, not of isolated sayings, but of the general tenor of His teaching, then it is simply suicidal to treat them in this way as the utterances of an authority whose *data* we may not examine or criticize. For it is only on account of the unique appeal which His teaching makes to reason and conscience that we have any grounds for treating Jesus as a supreme authority in religion or in morals. So much ought, I think, to be admitted by any critically-minded theologian, even if he accepts the miracles of Christ in the most old-fashioned sense as exceptions to the laws of nature. It is, indeed, extremely doubtful whether any certainty as to the occurrence and the miraculous character of certain events could prove the

* *The Place of Authority in Matters of Religious Belief*, 1891.

infallibility of Him by whom, or in connection with whose life, they were wrought; but in any case no theologian who has any adequate conception of the nature of historical evidence can well regard the Gospel miracles as sufficiently well proved to be capable of serving as the sole ultimate basis of a vast fabric of theological theory not otherwise capable of proof or reasonable defence.

Under these circumstances, how are we to distinguish between philosophy and theology? We cannot make the distinction turn upon the fact that one deals with unrevealed and the other with revealed truth. Revelation for us must be a matter of degree, and revelation at its highest is never of a kind which supersedes the exercise of reason and conscience. Are we, then, to say that the whole distinction is an anachronism—that Universities ought no longer to have faculties of theology distinct from the faculty of philosophy, or a larger faculty in which philosophy is included?

When we look at the matter from an abstract and strictly scientific point of view, there is much to be said for such a conclusion. It is true, as it seems to me, that there can be only one science of God, and that this science must rest upon the conclusions which human reason bases upon a survey of the whole of human experience, especially, of course, religious and moral experience. There are no data available which philosophy can logically regard as outside its scope, and theology cannot claim to possess any special or private sources of information which the philosopher must not recognize. It matters nothing whether you call this science philosophy or theology. I need not remind you that for Aristotle *θεολογία* was identical with philosophy, or rather with that supreme branch of philosophy otherwise called metaphysics. I do think it should be emphatically recognized that any theology which can claim to be regarded as a science must rest upon a basis of philosophy, and that there cannot be one science of God in the philosophical faculty and another science of God—whether regarded as an inferior or as a superior branch of science—in the faculty of theology. The ideal theologian must be a philosopher, and the ideal philosopher a theologian.

But the meaning of words—including those words which signify departments of knowledge—rests upon usage; and usage is, or ought to be, guided in part by considerations of practical convenience. Now when we look at the matter from this point of view, we shall, I think, see that it would not be desirable to attempt to abolish altogether the distinctions at present observed in the use of these terms, or to reorganize our Universities on the basis of such an abolition. In practice the identification of philosophy and theology can only be accepted with the following qualifications:

(1) From the point of view of philosophy, it is only a part of the area covered by philosophy which can with any convenience be treated

as identical with theology. The term "philosophy" is sometimes held to include a number of departmental sciences—logic, æsthetics, ethics, perhaps psychology—in which, though their conclusions have a profound bearing upon our theory of the universe at large, questions about God and His relation to the world are not directly raised. The theologian, like the philosopher, ought to know something about these subjects; but it would not be practically convenient to treat them as branches of theology. It is only philosophy in that narrower sense in which it may be identified with metaphysics which can, even from the point of view of an abstract classification of sciences, be identified with theology. And even within the limits of metaphysics there are many questions the bearing of which upon our view of the nature of God is more or less remote. All of them, it may be said, have consequences for our belief about God; but it would not be practically convenient to speak about a book on the theory of knowledge or the nature of universals as a theological book.

A treatise on the question of Idealism *versus* Realism would not naturally be treated as a theological book, though (for the Idealist at least) the problem is one which would hardly be discussed without running up into the problems of theology in its strict and supreme sense. The supreme problem of philosophy is the problem of theology, but it is only when that supreme question comes into sight that philosophy begins to pass into and become identical with theology as the term is usually understood.

It is only, then, a part of metaphysics which can naturally be identified with theology. Sometimes when the writer concentrates his attention upon the theological bearings or consequences of this view of the universe, his subject is described as the philosophy of religion. Between the philosophy of religion and theology in the stricter and narrower sense of the word I do not think it is possible to establish any fundamental distinction, except, indeed, when the philosophy of religion is treated as a mere inquiry into the psychological causes which produce religious belief without raising the question of objective truth or falsehood.*

(2) And this last remark suggests a second consideration. The term "theology" is commonly applied only to those philosophical systems of thought which make room for a belief in God, and a God who can in some measure be identified with the God of religion. If such a God exists, a philosophy which fails to recognize that existence must of course be so far a bad philosophy; but it is not practically convenient to make the division between sciences turn upon particular

* There are, perhaps, writers who would be disposed to make of the philosophy of religion an inquiry into distinctly *religious* experience only. This would not be accepted by those who do not believe in the possibility or rationality of thus isolating religious experience.

conclusions about which the professors of those sciences actually differ. As a matter of fact, some philosophies have no place for the idea of God. It would be inconvenient, therefore, to call Mr. Bertrand Russell or Dr. McTaggart a theologian, or, on the other hand, to refuse the name of philosopher to Professor Pringle-Pattison or Professor Webb. We want a name for the subject which all these writers discuss which implies nothing as to their conclusions. In ordinary usage philosophy, or the supreme branch of philosophy, only becomes identical with theology for philosophers who have some belief in God. So you may say that theology and philosophy are essentially the same subjects, but that they represent the same subject looked at from different points of view. Theology is at bottom philosophy looked at from a particular point of view. Philosophy is theology only so far as it supplies a solution of the supreme problem concerning the nature of God and His relation to the world.

(3) If we turn from the point of view of philosophy to that of theology, we shall find that in the subjects commonly embraced as a matter of common usage under the term "theology" there are many which cannot possibly be brought within the most extended use of the term "philosophy." The term "theology," if it is held to include that part of theology which has sometimes been spoken of as natural theology, and which is practically identical with the highest branch of philosophy, has been usually held to include also the study of the beliefs and doctrines of the historical religions, and especially of the historical religion to which its professors belong. And even for those who have parted company with the old absolute distinction between natural and revealed religion or theology it is obvious that a thorough and comprehensive study of religion must include the study of the history of religions, their sacred books and symbolic documents, and even the languages in which those books were written. Conclusions arrived at by such a study may, indeed, and ought to be used by the philosopher in building up his theory of the universe, just as he may and must use the conclusions of the natural sciences; but the study of the actual historical facts themselves can no more be treated as part of philosophy than the study of any other branch of history. Philosophy deals with the universal, not with the particular; with the universe at large, not with particular events in its history (even the subject known as the philosophy of history can hardly be regarded as a branch of pure philosophy, though it involves philosophy).* Yet it is convenient to regard these studies as belonging to theology. There is only one branch of theology which could with any plausibility be treated as absolutely identical with metaphysics—*i.e.*, dog-

* Except for those philosophers (if there are any such) who think that the course of history can be predicted *a priori* by a study of the categories.

matic theology. And even that attitude could only be adopted by one who (as is no doubt done by some) regards all events in time as having no special importance or significance for religion. But, after all, such an attitude is hard to carry to its strictly logical conclusions. It would follow from this position that one might be a philosopher without having read Plato, Aristotle, Kant, or Hegel, or any other philosopher in particular. And so theoretically one might. There have been so-called philosophers who have approximated to this magnificent ideal of originality—*e.g.*, Herbert Spencer. But the precedent was not, perhaps, an encouraging one. For practical purposes philosophy presupposes, if it does not include, the literature and history of philosophy, though no doubt the philosopher will insist that to be learned in such matters is not to be a philosopher. It should not, therefore, be thought that the study of religious literatures or other documents expressive of religious ideas is of no importance to the philosopher even *qua* philosopher. It must be confessed that the value of what professed philosophers have written about religion has often been impaired for the want of such knowledge. But the subject is too large and too distinct a one to be conveniently treated as a branch or annex of philosophy. It is obviously most convenient to treat the study of religious literatures, and especially of the formulated doctrines embodied in past or still current religious symbols, as belonging to theology in its wider sense, but not to philosophy. It is a subject which requires its own specialists.

I think it is, indeed, important to assert that dogmatic theology is a branch of knowledge which can only be advantageously studied or taught by one who has had some serious training in philosophy. There is a tendency, especially in this country, and most of all among Anglican theologians, to make the study of dogmatic theology purely historical—either to assume that the dogmatic theologian's task is simply to ascertain what has been decided to be truth by the Church authority which he holds to be supreme, with the assumption that those decisions must be implicitly accepted, or, on the other hand, to ignore all questions of truth and falsehood, and to make the subject a mere branch of antiquarian research.

It need hardly be contended that for those who regard themselves as members of any one historical religion, or even for anyone who regards any historical religions as having any truth in them, this is not a reasonable attitude. And the more importance anyone attaches to any traditional belief whatever—whether preserved in a sacred literature, or embodied in some systematic formulary, or merely handed down in the tradition and religious consciousness of a society—the more important does it become to study, not merely the origin and development, but the truth or falsehood of these beliefs.

And that can only be done by the trained philosopher. The philosopher as such is not expected to be acquainted—at least, in any detail—with these beliefs and their histories and literary embodiment. The question of their truth or falsehood cannot therefore be simply handed over to the philosopher, whose training has been purely philosophical. We do want special students of this subject, but they must be adequately trained in philosophy. It need hardly be pointed out that this is a requirement not always satisfied by the teachers of this subject. In fact, the importance attached in Protestant Churches to the historical and philological subjects ancillary to theology proper is so great that it is often hardly recognized that theology includes or has anything in particular to do with philosophy, or that there is any anomaly in the existence of a theologian who is totally ignorant of philosophy.* On this subject the theologians of the Roman Church have sounder ideas. The notion of a scholastic theologian unacquainted with philosophy would seem to them grotesque. But once more the theologian in the ordinary sense of the word, and even the "dogmatiker," must possess much knowledge of a kind which not every philosopher can be expected to possess.

We may sum up the results of our examination of these terms in these two propositions:

(1) There is a science, in the strictest sense of the word "science," which deals with the ultimate nature of God and the universe, and which may be called indifferently metaphysics or theology; but in practice it is only a part of the whole body of philosophical science—a part only of that supreme branch of philosophy called metaphysics, which can conveniently be identified with theology even in this narrowest (but truest) sense. Philosophy is theology only in so far as it deals with the nature of God and His relation to man and to the universe, and for those whose theory of the universe finds a place in it for the concept of God.

But (2) in practical usage theology is held to include a knowledge of the history of religion and of religious dogmas and of religious literature (as well as a philosophical inquiry into their truth and falsehood) which is not expected of the philosopher, at least of every philosopher, as such. This is true even of that supreme branch of theology called dogmatic. Still more, in a wider sense of the term, theology is used as a name, not for a single science, but for those por-

* Of course theology in its wider sense is so vast a subject that a man may be highly competent in one branch and totally ignorant of others. There is no reason why the Biblical exegete should be a philosopher (though it may be an advantage to him to be so), or why the "dogmatiker" should know Hebrew (though he experiences certain difficulties when he does not). What I have specially in mind is the dogmatic theologian who proposes (1) to explain, and (2) to examine traditional dogmas.

tions of many sciences or studies which are most closely connected with and necessary to the study of the true scientific theology. It is, of course, merely a question of usage and convenience how far this extension should be carried. Biblical exegesis, the textual and the higher criticism of Biblical and ecclesiastical literature, liturgiology, Biblical theology, symbolics, patristics, are universally regarded as belonging to theology. About other subjects there is more doubt. The position of the Professor of Ecclesiastical History has often been disputed: in practice he generally belongs to the theological faculty. A Professorship of Hebrew is often treated as belonging to the theological faculty because of the accident that there is practically no Hebrew literature except a literature in which the theologian as such is vitally interested. A Professorship of Greek has never been so treated, because not all Greek literature is of this character. Of course, the ideal theologian should be a Greek scholar, and he would not be a very good Greek scholar if he knew nothing of classical and non-theological Greek writers; but he need not know so much about them as a Professor of Greek. Theology in this wide sense may be compared to a science like geology, which is not, strictly speaking, a science at all, but really consists of a whole group of sciences, or fragments or aspects of sciences, in so far as they are concerned with, and necessary to, the solution of certain particular problems, the problems themselves being marked out from other problems by considerations of practical convenience rather than by any abstract scientific principle of classification. The geologist must know the parts or the aspects of chemistry and mineralogy which have a bearing on the history of this particular planet, though theoretically the study of this particular planet is only a part of the study of the material universe in general. He must be enough of a botanist and a biologist to be able to study the fossil remains of animals and plants, though of course biology, considered as a system of universal truths, knows nothing of the difference between extinct and still surviving species. So the theologian must know those aspects or periods of history which are of most importance for the history of religion, though it is quite impossible theoretically to draw a sharp line between ecclesiastical and general history. He must know certain languages, and certain parts of the literature written in those languages, though there is no scientific line of demarcation to be drawn between sacred and profane philology, and so on.

We have so far been concerned mainly with a discussion as to the meaning of words—the meaning which they have, or which it is convenient that they should be given, in common usage. And the tendency of such inquiries is certainly not to exalt, but rather to diminish, the importance of controversies about the determination of frontiers between different branches of knowledge. The more we

investigate such questions, the more we discover that one branch of knowledge runs into another, and that the thorough study of any branch of knowledge—with the exception, I suppose, of the most abstract of all, the science of pure mathematics—presupposes or leads up into many others; while the more concrete and complex branches of knowledge, and, above all, the supreme science of philosophy, ideally presuppose an amount of knowledge which practically no one man can possibly possess. The question, therefore, of the amount and kind of knowledge which can be included in any of these branches and demanded of its professors becomes merely a question of what is practical and what is convenient. Assuredly that is the case with theology in its widest sense. The theologian cannot even dispense himself, as the philosopher theoretically though not practically may do, from a knowledge of all particular facts in time and space on the pretext that he has only to do with the eternal and the universal. There is no branch of human knowledge which may not have some bearing upon the problems of God and the universe. The ideal theologian would approximate to the possessor of universal knowledge.

So far we have been engaged upon a purely theoretical inquiry, and the results at which we have arrived may seem to be too theoretical, and perhaps too vague, to be of much importance or even of much interest. But now I should like to say a few words as to their bearing upon certain questions of current controversy, about which it is of some real importance, both theoretical and practical, to have clear ideas.

(1) There is a theory which can claim the support of some great names, according to which the proper function of the theologian is to mediate between the orthodox belief of a given age or religious community and the conclusions of the highest speculative philosophy. He is not, indeed, to acquiesce absolutely in the popularly accepted traditional views. He is to use the conclusions of learning and science and philosophy to modify or to reinterpret the traditional dogmas or formulæ; to present a version of them which shall not be intolerable to the instructed and more or less philosophically educated person; to read into them as much as he can of the higher truth arrived at by the speculative inquirer. But still he does not *qua* theologian, it seems to be implied, aim at actual truth; so far as he does so, his task passes over into that of the philosopher pure and simple. I have already recognized an element of truth in this position. I have recognized that the theologian must concern himself with actual traditional, more or less formulated beliefs in a way which the philosopher is not bound to do. The philosopher should not, indeed, neglect the light which may be thrown upon the ultimate problems of the universe by religious experience, or (as I should prefer for myself

to express it) by the actual religious beliefs, emotions, and aspirations of mankind. When Cicero or his Greek authorities argue for the belief in God *ex consensu gentium* (whatever may be thought of the accuracy of their facts or the validity of their inferences), it cannot be said that they are abandoning either the problems or the methods of the philosopher. But it is only in so far as these actual beliefs of mankind supply him with data for his arguments that he is concerned with them. The philosopher as such does not know or care whether his conclusions about the freedom of the will agree with those expressed by St. Augustine or by the Westminster Confession, nor is he expected to know even what is the doctrine of these authorities. Further, it must be admitted that in point of fact what theologians have to a great extent done is to construct a sort of bridge between the best science or philosophy of their day and the traditional belief of some religious community. They have interpreted, and often (consciously or unconsciously) modified, the traditional belief as the result of their own thought and reflection or that of the independent thinkers by whom they have been influenced. Often, too, it can hardly be denied, they have altered—not to say twisted and distorted —the philosophical belief in order to establish some conformity between that belief and the requirements of tradition. It would be quite easy, for instance, to mention modern theologians who have shown remarkable skill in enlisting some philosophical catchword of the moment—"development," or "degradation," or "divine immanence," or the personality of the social group, or Pragmatism —in the service of some traditional, sometimes some more or less reactionary, form of religious belief. So far as this is done in good faith, so far as the theory put forward is one which is really up to the level of his own knowledge and insight, the theologian is not to be blamed for so doing. Often the theologian has been a man who quite sincerely occupies a position midway between the requirements of tradition and those of science. Even the more advanced theologian is quite justified in exhibiting and insisting upon whatever measure of conformity he can discover between some traditionally accepted formula and the conclusions of independent thought, though we may not personally attach great importance to the traditional formula which he interprets or reinterprets; or, again, he may legitimately use such formulæ to express in a popular way truths which would not be intelligible to his audiences if presented on their own merits with the precision and exactness which would be demanded in a philosophical treatise. But what I do not like about this theory is its suggestion that the theologian is justified in deliberately shutting his eyes to the question of absolute truth or falsehood, in deliberately presenting as truth what he knows to be only a sort of diplomatic compromise or system of half-truths. That for pur-

poses of popular teaching we have to be content with much half-truth, much crudity, much excessive anthropomorphism, and that (even apart from consideration for others) we all have more or less to adopt in moments and for purposes of devotion many modes of expression which in our more speculative moments we should feel to need some qualification or supplementation—these are propositions which few will be disposed to deny. A prayer or a hymn, or even a sermon, is not to be criticized as though it were an exposition of the author's whole theory of the universe. But I do maintain that the theologian, and the theologian as such, is bound to aim at truth; and that, though in the pulpit and even in the theological lecture-room he must often be content not to push his inquiries into those profoundly speculative regions which the highest philosophy seeks to penetrate, he should endeavour, so far as his own knowledge and the capacity of his audience permit, to bring his conclusions into harmony with the requirements of philosophical truth. Anything like the old nominalistic position that what is false in philosophy may be true in theology should be regarded as intolerable. Theology demands as much sincerity as philosophy.

(2) These questions have an important bearing upon the practical organization of Universities. I have already in part defended the existence of a distinct theological faculty by showing that the theologian must for his particular task possess much knowledge which is not commonly included in the department of the philosopher—bits of knowledge which scientifically belong to many departments. But so far I have not emphasized the point that in practice the theologian is concerned, not with the history, the documents, and the literature of religion in general, but mainly with the history and beliefs of one particular historical religion to which he and his community adhere. Now if we looked upon theology simply as a speculative inquiry into religion, this concentration might be difficult to defend. And on this ground the late Professor Scott Holland, when arguing in favour of laicizing the theological degrees of his University, and of throwing them open without the requirement of tests, insisted that a University (when once it had ceased to be strictly denominational) was bound to treat theology simply as a branch of liberal knowledge, and should, for the purpose of defining the scope of the faculty, draw no distinction whatever between Christian and Buddhist theology. We all remember how he used all the resources of his eloquence and his subtlety in adorning this thesis, how he revelled in pushing it to the utmost logical consequences, quite regardless of the votes he was losing. No doubt he was influenced by a fine enthusiasm for academic liberty, though perhaps not quite without a touch of sectarian pleasure in ignoring any distinction between the non-Catholic Christian and the avowed non-Christian. But it cannot

be too strongly insisted that this way of looking at the theological faculty is completely unhistorical, and completely opposed to the principle upon which the distinction between faculties is, and for purposes of practical convenience should be, based. Whether we look to the history of the past or to the actual organization of Universities all the world over, we find that the theological faculty is essentially a *professional* faculty. It is not as a branch of scientific knowledge but as the subject-matter of a learned profession, that the University recognizes theology as distinct from philosophy. A theological faculty aims at supplying the knowledge which is required for the exercise of a particular profession—the profession of the Christian ministry—just as the legal faculty aims at training lawyers, and the medical faculty physicians.* And from this point of view it is absurd to contend that it should treat Buddhist theology as completely on a level with Christian theology, and confer its degrees upon a man who is learned in Buddhism but completely ignorant of Christianity—as absurd as it would be to contend that the legal faculty should treat English law as no more important than the law of China or of Dahomey. No doubt from the point of view of an enlightened modern theology it is eminently desirable that the Christian minister should know something about other religious than the Christian, but he need not know as much about any one of them as he ought to know about Christianity, its history, its sacred books, and its traditional beliefs. From this point of view the question whether or not a theological faculty should be denominational or undenominational is a mere question of detail and practical convenience. Personally I think it is quite possible and very desirable that theological degrees, and at least some theological chairs, should be freed from clerical restrictions or other tests. But it is absurd to say that a University is bound to ignore all reference to the actual beliefs of the Churches in filling a theological chair or drawing up a theological curriculum. It is possible, and within limits desirable, that the theological students of many Christian denominations should be educated by the same teachers. But German governments are perfectly justified in providing special Catholic faculties of theology, so long as future Catholic priests will not receive their theological education at the hands of Protestants; and it would not be a true liberalism, but an inverted kind of intolerance, to insist on appointing an avowed agnostic to a chair of theology in this or any other University. Restrictions on academical liberty are no doubt an evil, but in this, as in many other cases, some restrictions on such liberty are demanded by practical considerations. We could not expect the Government of Mr. Lloyd George to

* A distinct statement to this effect is found in the modern statutes of German Universities.

appoint a Bolshevist to a chair of political philosophy, even if the chair were not specially connected with a training-school for the Civil Service. We could not expect the electors to a medical chair to appoint a homœopathist, so long as the majority of medical students do not want to be taught homœopathy, and the majority of the public do not want to be homœopathically treated. I myself regret that the recently founded Professorship of Philosophy of the Christian Religion should be fenced by a denominational test, but (so long as the professorship is regarded as belonging to the theological faculty) we cannot say that the restriction is inconsistent with any absolute principle. But if the restrictions were removed, I do not think it would be reasonable for an elector to such a chair to feel bound to elect Mr. Bradley or Dr. McTaggart, because he might think him an abler man than some less unorthodox candidate. In the selection of all theological teachers I should myself be in favour of encouraging a very wide freedom of thought, but I should recognize that such liberty must have limits. It is a good thing to encourage liberty of thought both within and without the Churches, but in the education of religious teachers some regard must be paid to the demands of the community to which they have to minister.

(3) And, lastly, the most direct moral which I wish to draw from these abstract reflections is the imperative necessity of philosophical studies for the theologian, the clergyman, the teacher of religion. I know the remark will be resented from more than one quarter, but I venture to assert that in these days the belief in God must rest in the last resort upon a basis of philosophy. That does not mean that nobody but a philosopher can be religious. The religious belief of the average man will in the future, as it has done in the past, rest mainly upon authority. The average man absorbs the belief of his environment. But in these days, as much or much more than in the past, no religious belief will permanently retain its hold upon either the individual or the community which does not satisfy men's reason, so far as they use their reason. And so far as reason is used, the resulting belief becomes philosophy; or rather, I should say, so far as a man analyses the use which he makes of reason, it becomes philosophy. Many a man may have a religious belief which is thoroughly rational as far as it goes, though he may not consciously analyse the grounds upon which that belief really reposes. In proportion as he does analyse those grounds he becomes a philosopher. And for those who are professionally called upon to be teachers of religion, it is surely desirable that they should have to some extent gone through this process, and be able to state the grounds of their religious belief; for unless they have to some extent done so, they will be incapable of communicating the grounds of their

belief to others, still less of meeting the objections which may be urged against it. To examine the ultimate grounds of religious belief they must become philosophers.

And here we have to meet a formidable objection. Philosophy is a very difficult subject. Even among able, intellectual, and highly educated men there are many who have very little capacity for this particular subject; and among the rank and file of the clergy in the Church of England, and probably in most Churches, there are many who would themselves be the first to say that the subject is altogether above their heads. My reply must be brief. I should say (1) that the important thing is that those who are more or less capable of such studies should have gone through something like a systematic course of philosophy, whatever becomes of the incapable. The distressing thing is that so many men of fair ability and good general education should think and preach and write in a way which implies an impossible view of the universe, a view which is vaguely felt to be impossible by the mass of intelligent people, who could not perhaps fully explain the grounds of the impossibility; and that even theologians of distinction should sometimes write about ultimate questions in a way which shows them to be mere babes in philosophy. (2) We must have *some* philosophy, or (some might be disposed to say) some substitute for philosophy, even for the less intellectual and less instructed ministers of religion. A distinguished Roman Catholic theologian, one quite alive to the inadequacy of the scholastic philosophy to modern requirements, once said to me: "The great advantage of the scholastic philosophy is that it is a philosophy which can be taught"—be taught, he meant, to the average seminarist, whom no education could make into an independent thinker. We want some modern equivalent of the scholastic philosophy. No doubt, from the point of view of the real philosopher, a philosophy which has been stereotyped, which has been reduced to the form of authorized answers to authorized questions—cut-and-dried replies to cut-and-dried objections—has lost its highest educational value, and orthodox systems are by no means the only philosophies which are sometimes in danger of sinking to this condition. If it does not absolutely prevent men thinking, such a philosophy compels them to think in grooves, and the object of philosophy is to make men think. The high philosophical expert is disposed to look with some contempt upon what he calls popular philosophy, by which he means any philosophy that can be understood by the average man without a very elaborate technical education. For some of them the ideal would be a world divided into a small circle of daringly independent savants, and a patient, submissive world regulated by some system of beneficent superstition which does not even pretend to be rational. But, whatever may be thought of such an ideal, the modern world is not

going to be regulated in that way. Some sort of philosophy or rational guidance through life the world must have. Any Church which hopes to supply such guidance must have its ministers instructed in the elements of philosophy, though it may be a philosophy which the philosopher will hardly recognize as such. At present, it is probable that a large proportion of our Church of England clergy, and a varying proportion of other denominations, could not give the simplest intelligent and intelligible answer to a working man who asked him: "How do we know that God exists? How do we know that the soul is not material? Has God revealed Himself to man? Is not conscience an illusion? Must we believe in free-will, and what do we mean by it? Have we any reason for believing in a future life apart from the historical evidence for the Resurrection?" Most of our theological colleges do not even attempt to supply their students with an answer to such questions. And it is absolutely necessary that they should do so, whether you call such answers philosophy, or popular philosophy, or something which is not philosophy at all. And at least for those who are to teach the future teachers of religion something like a real course in philosophy is eminently desirable, though I do not suggest that every theologian who deals with such questions should be a man profoundly versed in the highest mysteries of technical metaphysics. There are, to use the rather lofty formula of some philosophers, many levels of thought. It is possible to teach even philosophy on many different levels, and among books on the highest level some are more difficult than others. It is desirable that those clergymen who are capable of it should receive the highest philosophical education, and that all future clergymen should at least be taught to think, or to appreciate the thought of others up to a certain point. The level of the pulpit cannot, of course, intellectually be the level of the highest philosophy. Even philosophers do not want to be taught technical philosophy in church. What is important is that what is taught should be true as far as it goes, capable of being defended from a higher level or raised to the level at which it can be defended, and, above all, that it should not (as is sometimes the case) be on a level below the habitual level of the average man in the street.

H. Rashdall.

THE LAMBETH CONFERENCE

The utterances of authority derive their first and immediate claim to attention from some relation of those who make them to the past. Even in the case of great originators and men of genius this is true; for a large part of their originality consists in the new treatment they impart to what is traditional and old. This common inheritance is the currency in which they do business with their generation. They may go back far to find it, as Botticelli or Michelangelo went back to Greece, Aquinas to Aristotle, Luther to St. Paul; or it may be ready to hand, as the works of Holinshed and North were to Shakespeare, or those of Petrus Ramus to Bacon. Christ Himself, who was observed to speak "with authority, and not as the Scribes," accredited His words by reference to Scriptures which He and His hearers alike accepted as inspired. And still more is this the case with those whose authority is constituted primarily in the trusteeship of great institutions. The links with the past may be of many different kinds—hereditary succession, constitutional or legal appointment, sacramental continuity—but they must be assured. Some of the most curious chapters of history, such as the functions of the *interrex* in ancient Rome or the mediæval controversy over investiture, bear witness even by their inconsistencies to this deep-seated instinct. It means that, when problems press, there shall always be some person or persons who shall have a recognized right to be heard, whatever they may say. And when to the formal possession of *imperium* is added the association with the past which is implied in long experience and successful service, the *primâ facie* claims of such an authority are very great indeed.

Yet this is a primary test only. The ultimate criterion, so far as human history is concerned, is more searching: it is the test of time. There is a sense in which this can never be ascertained, so long as we can contemplate a future; for history has a strange way of reshuffling its materials, changing perspectives, commingling old and new, and in this process the most august precedents, decisions, actions play their part with the rest. Yet there is a proximate future which we can, or at least think we can, provide for. There is always a rising generation knocking at the doors of the present. And the practical test which we can apply to the utterances of authority at any given moment is this: How far do they exhibit a spirit and outline a policy calculated to enlist the best minds of the coming age? In what measure and to what end do they—and will they—kindle the imaginations of those younger men and women who by tradition and education are most reluctant to commit themselves, yet, once committed, are the natural leaders in Church

and nation? *αὐὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη*, said Heraclitus: "a dry soul is wisest." And it is the dry souls—those in which reason counts for more than sentiment—which both religion and politics are in danger of losing at the present moment. Will the Report of the Lambeth Conference have any effect in restoring them to either?

While contemporary comment is most commonly concerned with what the Church does, the real judgment is being passed on what it *is*. It is that—its faith, not its works—which supremely matters. There are those, no doubt, who cannot believe except "for the works' sake"; but such belief is never more than a *pis aller*, and its loss no irretrievable disaster. On the other hand, the more thoughtful are inclined, and rightly so, to be very exacting in their demands on what we may call the Church's *aseity*. It claims, teaches, promises, enjoins, forbids so much, handles such immense issues, and touches human life so intimately, that nothing but an intrinsic necessity could justify it. It must be itself part of the Truth divinely revealed—itself an object of faith—if it is to be regarded as more than the voice of one crying in the wilderness. As one voluntary association among the many which have beneficent aims, it cannot hope to compete with success; for the organization of good works is now a business, like any other, and has no necessary connection with religion. And it is religion which people expect of Christ's Church, if they expect anything at all. It is one of the ironies of history that Protestantism, which began by proclaiming Justification by Faith, should now be foremost, especially in America, in reducing Christianity to the promotion of Works. Yet as people are growing more and more doubtful of the qualities and propensities of modern civilization, so this conception of the Church is found less and less satisfying. What is needed by those who feel such needs at all is a society or pattern of life which is looking in a different direction from all others: not one good among many goods, but a supernatural good among those that are natural; a feature in the whole complex of social life as arresting by its contrast to its surroundings as the ape in the celebrated picture of Veronese. And this contrast will show itself wherever the two orders impinge on one another—in belief, in politics and morals, and in art. On its religious side it will present a coherence and a certitude of principle such as may be expected to distinguish Divine revelation from the shifting and inconsistent utterances of human opinion. As a French writer has put it: "L'unité doctrinale est le miracle permanent de l'Eglise." The truth it holds by is of and for all ages and all nations, because, if true, it is part of the essential structure of things. And this catholicity of principle will react inevitably on its witness in secular affairs, providing for patriotism a higher loyalty than the welfare of any one nation and for morals a peculiar scale of values. Even

art, whose very breath is independence, cannot for long refuse dealings with a source of images so striking and so fresh.

Yet this is not all. If it were, the claims of the Roman Catholic Church would be difficult to resist; for, whatever may have been the case in past centuries, its inner character is undeniably distinct. But it is not all. Rooted as it is in the eternal order, the Church has to function in time; and for this it needs a mobility and elasticity of life and outlook which will not always reject new wine on the plea that the old is best. Principle and precedent are not identical, however closely history and experience may have interwoven them. Precedents are guides, sign-posts, cautions, and so their study never grows old. But principles are ends in themselves, to be sought even where precedent gives little or no help. It will mean taking risks—the risks of alarming the conservative and of encouraging the rash. Yet even the Founder of Christianity Himself was not exempt, it would seem, from this necessity of testing the unknown. When He went apart in the Garden of Gethsemane and was in great agony of spirit there was still a possibility that the cup might be withdrawn; and the response to the Divine Will, which had been the secret of His repose and the ground of His Transfiguration, was to be exposed to yet one more trial before it fulfilled itself in the Cross. And likewise in the Church the unchanging principles which are the guarantee of its inward peace have constantly to face the ordeal of new situations. The responsibility for the way in which the principles are applied never ceases. New knowledge, new obstacles, new opportunities are presented; and it is in rightly envisaging these that the Church shows itself possessed by the living Spirit who guides into all truth.

This double character, at once Catholic in principle and liberal in policy, has been the mark of all the greatest phases of Church history; and its preservation has been one of the main tasks, as it is the best justification, of our Communion. In considering how far it is to be found governing the deliberations of the Bishops it is important to bear one fact in mind. The questions before the Conference were nearly all administrative, not doctrinal; and, with one significant exception, they were not such administrative questions as run up into doctrine most directly. This may be regretted, but it must be remembered. There are certain burning problems still unsettled in the Church of England on which a decision is much to be desired, but is not to be looked for here; such, for example, as the sacrificial character of the Eucharist—perhaps the most vital issue for religion now before us, because it connects directly with our conception of God, and its presentment. Yet even there we should do well to bear in mind that in Churches in communion with us, such as the Scottish or the American, liturgies are in use which place our

adherence to this doctrine beyond cavil. Again, in the sphere of pastoral discipline the urgent question of Reservation cries aloud for solution, but finds none here; and we must content ourselves with the consoling reflection that the Church of England has never yet withstood for long any custom which could show itself, as this has, an imperative pastoral necessity. The fact is that we tend to become obsessed with purely English difficulties, and to forget that we are only one field in a very extensive domain.

It is, indeed, just this world-outlook which is so impressive in the pages of the Lambeth Conference Report, and all the more so as it is implied rather than proclaimed, believed rather than professed. For the last half-century, as the record of former Conferences shows, it has been growing; but now it has, so to speak, cut the painter and committed itself to the high seas. A statement like the following: "When loyalty to his own nation comes into conflict with loyalty to that holy nation of which Christ is King, a Christian can have no doubt which loyalty must give way,"* could hardly have come from the pen of a Victorian assembly. The repeated and explicit assertion of the Catholic status of the Church of England and of the obligations entailed thereby are in striking contrast with the rarity of any such allusions in the official documents of 1897 and 1908. Where before we had the voice of an expanded Church of England, to-day we have the voice of the one supranational Church of which the New Testament speaks. And this new standpoint discloses itself in a remarkable symptom. The line of vision represented in this Report is quite manifestly at an oblique angle with that of English secular life. There is no trace, for example, of the Erastian conception of the Church as an institution of the State—a conception which, far from being dead, has done duty of late in Italy, and governed the attitude of a statesman like Baron Sonnino towards the Papacy. Instead, it is made abundantly clear that the Church derives an independent life from an independent source; and it is from this ground that it addresses itself to every nation, be the consequences what they may. There is a fine dignity in this spirit, worthy of an Ambrose or an Anselm. Whether it must not lead eventually to some still further readjustment of the relations between Church and State is another matter.

That first, then;—a witness to religion characteristically Catholic. But, by consequence, a similar change is perceptible in the relation of the Conference to problems of politics and industry. Yet here a curious fact is to be observed. The Church's attitude has altered in these regards since the last Conference quite as markedly as in respect of matters more strictly religious. Nevertheless, the oblique

* Report (S.P.C.K., 2s. net), p. 22.

angle between the Church's and the world's angle of vision, adverted to above, is far less marked here. Why is this ? It is surely because behind both Church and world there lies the unforgettable experience of the war. As might be expected, the faithful have learnt its lessons for religion as well as for mundane affairs; but for the latter, at least, the world has learnt them too, and there is no one whose thoughts rise above the purely selfish who does not realize that economic welfare is primarily an international question. The mutual dependence of all countries on one another's industry stands out in sharp relief on the background of poverty and bewilderment; and the co-operation of all nations in production and exchange has become for thousands an interest strong enough to oust rancour from the mind and to supersede even the dictates of a just indignation. This does not mean that the voice of the Church is unneeded. The consonance of duty with interest makes its task initially easier; people can see more quickly what we are driving at. But a project such as the League of Nations and all that it stands for cannot make sure of its future unless it has other and deeper sanctions than those of temporal expediency; and it will make all the difference if, when the strain on its tissues comes, they are found to be strengthened by the great binding force represented in the Catholic religion.

The Reunion decisions are those which will attract the most attention among the *acta* of the Conference. I use the word " decisions " advisedly; for the matter had passed beyond the phase of general statement, and it was necessary for the Bishops to define the attitude of our Communion towards certain quite definite issues. Moreover, though the Conference as a whole is advisory rather than executive, it is inconceivable that the policy here resolved upon should be discarded in favour of any of its rivals. The strong testimony borne to the Church's Catholic principles is accompanied by, and prepares the way for, the advocacy of certain means to the end which they imply, and the rejection of certain others. The end is the organic unity of the One Body, gathering up from all nations their contribution to the Divine Kingdom. Other kinds of " union " are conceivable, but are ruled out as incompatible with the completeness of the Gospel—as, for instance, the various schemes of Federation, which, leaving the question of the Ministry untouched, only conceal without removing the essential facts of schism. And in this matter of the Ministry nothing is more momentous than the offer of the Bishops, on their own behalf and that of their clergy, to accept from the authorities of other Communions " a form of commission or recognition which would commend our ministry to their congregations as having its place in the one family life."* Precisely the same offer

* Report, p. 135.

was made by the Bishop of Zanzibar to the Kikuyu Conference in 1918, and was set aside in favour of other proposals.* It has now received the *imprimatur* of the Bishops of the Anglican Communion. And in itself it constitutes an unanswerable witness—the most effective, indeed, since the Reformation—to belief in the Divine institution of the hierarchy. Episcopacy has only too often in the past tended to commend its claims by display of the secular influences of birth or wealth. All that is now abandoned, and the result is enormously to magnify the office, not as possessed, but as entrusted from above; for none could so minimize personal feeling unless profoundly convinced of the objective greatness and supernatural character of his calling.

The terms of the Reunion Appeal and Resolutions are capable of application, and were no doubt intended to apply, in more than one direction—towards the Churches of the East and the West no less than towards the Churches commonly called "Evangelical." Preaching shortly after the Conference, the Archbishop of York is reported as follows (*The Times*, August 16, 1920):

> "To Roman Catholics he would venture to say, hoping that their ears were not wholly deaf, may not this ideal be after all fuller, richer, more true to God's leading of human life than the ideal, sometimes so impressive, of the submission of all to one uniform system? Was it too late for the great Church to be moved by the new Spirit?"

It would be a mistake to read into this utterance more than is intended. The insistence upon "the Creed commonly called Nicene as the *sufficient* statement of the Christian faith" (the italics are mine) at least implies that for us the definitions of the Counter-Reformation could not, any more than those of the Reformation, have the force and weight of œcumenical decisions; and many changes of perspective would have to take place in the Roman Communion before the offer to us of a Uniat status could be practically considered. None the less, the fact that the appeal is seriously addressed to the Roman Church is a great step forward. There will be some, at least, in that Communion, as well as in our own, who will ponder it.

This is no doubt true also of the East. It may seem to some as though the offer to set our own Orders beyond dispute in the Orthodox Church might be of great practical moment in the immediate future. Certainly the pledge must be redeemed if it proves necessary for intercommunion. But it seems more probable that, by the time such a step was actually contemplated, the further researches into our Orders to which the Eastern authorities are devoting themselves,

* *Documents bearing on the Problem of Christian Unity and Fellowship* (S.P.C.K., 2s. net), pp. 46, 47.

together with the increased mutual acquaintance between the two Churches, will lead to a recognition by the East of our Orders as they are. Be that as it may, the Lambeth Conference has at least shown how one of the existing obstacles can be overcome.

The reaction of these Resolutions on the Free Churches is, however, the matter which will most exercise the minds of the English-speaking world, and on that subject there is little to be said. America, India, possibly even Scotland, are more promising fields than England. There are still in this country theological munition-factories which are turning out weapons suited only to internecine warfare; and the transfer to the manufacture of the heavenly armour, though it is proceeding, is not yet complete. Fortunately, the urgency of the battle with secularism at home and with paganism abroad, and the massing in all parts of the world of the big battalions of "principalities and powers and spiritual wickedness in high places," is awakening all Christians to the fundamental strategy of the situation. One plea only I will permit myself—with Churchmen, that they should keep their eyes fixed on the frontiers of the Church, and not be dismayed by slow progress and much misunderstanding at home; and with Nonconformists, who honestly desire Disestablishment in the interests of religion, that they should not allow it to colour their response to the Bishops' appeal. For it is as certain as anything can be that, if Disestablishment comes, it will be the work of a *Zeitgeist* far beyond the control of any religious body, and will mark something like an apostasy of the English people—already, perhaps, too far advanced to be stayed—from the Christian faith.

Two other matters in the Resolutions of the Conference deserve special consideration. The first is Marriage. The line taken by the Bishops on this subject aptly illustrates, alike by its positive content and by its contrast with the utterances of former Conferences, the general impressions of the Report which I have already summarized. The effect will best be seen if the relevant passages from the Resolutions of 1908 and of 1920 are set out in parallel columns:

1908.	1920.
39. This Conference reaffirms the resolution of the Conference of 1888 as follows: "(A) That, inasmuch as our Lord's words expressly forbid divorce, except in case of fornication or adultery, the Christian Church cannot recognize divorce in any other than the excepted case, or give any sanction to the marriage	66. Recognizing that to live a pure and chaste life before and after marriage is, for both sexes, the unchangeable Christian standard, attainable and attained through the help of the Holy Spirit by men and women in every age, the Conference desires to proclaim the universal obligation of this standard, and its vital importance

of any person who has been divorced contrary to this law during the life of the other party.

"(B) That under no circumstances ought the guilty party, in the case of a divorce for fornication or adultery, to be regarded, during the lifetime of the innocent party, as a fit recipient of the blessing of the Church on marriage.

"(C) That, recognizing the fact that there always has been a difference of opinion in the Church on the question whether our Lord meant to forbid marriage to the innocent party in a divorce for adultery, the Conference recommends that the clergy should not be instructed to refuse the Sacraments or other privileges of the Church to those who, under civil sanction, are thus married."

40. When an innocent person has, by means of a court of law, divorced a spouse for adultery, and desires to enter into another contract of marriage, it is undesirable that such a contract should receive the blessing of the Church.

(Carried by 87 votes to 84.)*

as an essential condition of human happiness.

67. The Conference affirms as our Lord's principle and standard of marriage a lifelong and indissoluble union, for better, for worse, of one man with one woman, to the exclusion of all others on either side, and calls on all Christian people to maintain and bear witness to this standard.

Nevertheless, the Conference admits the right of a national or regional Church within our Communion to deal with cases which fall within the exception mentioned in the record of our Lord's words in St. Matthew's Gospel, under provisions which such Church may lay down.

The Conference, while fully recognizing the extreme difficulty of Governments in framing marriage laws for citizens many of whom do not accept the Christian standard, expresses its firm belief that in every country the Church should be free to bear witness to that standard through its powers of administration and discipline exercised in relation to its own members.†

What a contrast of spirit! The earlier document is redolent of compromise in every line, devoid of unanimity, uncertain of principle. In the later, on the contrary, marked as it is by a fine handling of Scripture, Christ's ideal is asserted at the outset, asserted as practicable, asserted as matter of discipline. The Bride of Christ has lifted herself out of the sloughs of worldliness and doubt, and stands in all her pristine purity pointing to the great Revealer and to the fountains of pardon and grace. How the standard will be applied and the discipline exercised is a matter for national and regional Churches. Whatever be the critical explanation or the meaning of the Matthæan exception, it represents without doubt some practice which obtained in a local division of the Church of the first century, and we cannot therefore say that the decision of such matters is outside the competence of a part of the Church. In this country no doubt the National Assembly will have to exercise its judgment; and, with the declaration of the true standard so plainly set forth as we have it here, it would be surprising if canons of discipline were not made to conform to it.

* *The Five Lambeth Conferences*, 1867–1908 (S.P.C.K., 12s. 6d.), pp. 326, 327.
† Report, p. 44.

My own belief is that the distinction between the innocent and the guilty party is far less real than a legal judgment would imply, and must be abandoned. The criterion of readmission to Communion will be penitence, and that alone; and in no case will Churches or clergy be available for the remarriage of those who have been divorced.

The last point to which attention may be drawn is the group of Resolutions and the Report of the Committee dealing with social and industrial questions. The Committee's Reports, though bound up with the Resolutions, are not to be regarded as emanating from the Conference as a whole or as possessing any authority. But in this case the Resolutions are with one notable exception so general and vague that we need to call in the Report to fill the gaps. The one exception is Temperance, on which a firm and progressive line is taken; but the subject is too large for discussion here. For the rest, one must confess to some disappointment with these Resolutions. They do not seem to bite. The sentiments expressed are no doubt excellent, but we cannot help being reminded of the words of the Sophoclean Ajax:

οὐ πρὸς ἰατροῦ σοφοῦ
θρηνεῖν ἐπῳδὰς πρός τομῶντι πήματι.*

The industrial system, with the affiliated questions of the mutual relation and economic position of classes of the population, is too vast, too intricate, too specialized to be susceptible in any considerable degree to the appeals of ecclesiastical authority. The knife which the wounds crave here is " the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God "; " there is none like that " for sharpness or for strength, and the business of authority is to enjoin ways in which it may be made effective. In other words, we want something more definite and spiritually constructive than the Lambeth Conference has given us.

Two suggestions will make clear what I mean. There is a consensus of opinion that one of the most potent remedies for our social *malaise* is to be sought in education. Institutions like the Workers' Educational Association have probably done more to restore the working classes to a sense of community with the whole people than the most successful strikes or the largest increases in wages; for it has opened new sources of wealth and freedom to the spirit, and knowledge is not a depreciating asset. The State, moreover, has set its hand to a great task in the attempt to lengthen the number of years spent by children at school and to ensure better quality of teaching by raising the position of teachers. But there is still a work which cries aloud for the Church's lead. I am not thinking of the support

* Sophocles, *Ajax*, ll. 581, 582.

of public opinion necessary to translating the new Education Act into force; the most earnest reformers cannot be blind to the matter of cost and the need of making the outlay by degrees. Rather, there is a work which needs to be, and can be, done now. I refer to the opportunity for enlisting men and women of Public School and University standard as teachers in the national system of education. The higher salaries already in force offer a career to any whose sense of vocation is strong enough to overcome convention. Here is a piece of practical service which the Church can do much to encourage. My own limited experience has brought me in touch with a group of half a dozen undergraduates at Oxford—men of the best type in faith and education—who intend to offer themselves for service of this kind in the North of England. Why should the practice not become common? It would mean bringing into the lives of those in industry at their most impressionable period a spirit and traditions which are peculiarly instilled by the Public Schools, a type of fellowship which has known how to combine discipline with freedom, because resting both upon love. Only a new creative spirit can work the miracle of transformation which the industrial system requires; and there is no point at which it can enter the system more easily and with more sanguine hopes of fruitfulness than the schools of our great cities.

The second suggestion is of a different kind, involving not, like the first, a fresh kind of apostolate, but a new, or at least a newly authoritative, invitation. For some years past Father Plater, S.J., has drawn attention, in the *Hibbert Journal* and elsewhere, to the remarkable success attending the institution in Belgium, and of late years in England, of Working Men's Retreats. Some attempts have been made in this country and in our own Communion to work on similar lines—with what success I do not know. But at least the experiment is one which deserves the appreciative consideration of our fathers in God. Here is one clear way of supplementing the defects of our parochial system. It answers to the migratory habits which are now establishing themselves among the wage-earners, to whom the expense of travel seems but a *bagatelle*. And it is something which the Catholic Church, the mother of all men and women, can alone provide. The Christian Social Union, which has surely outgrown its earlier tasks, might well conduct the necessary propaganda. But more than that is needed if it is to do what it might. I would advocate it as a part of the definite policy of the Church of England towards national reconstruction and the recovery of social equilibrium. Some dramatic stroke will be required to inaugurate it. The Winchester Diocesan Conference is to appoint a committee this month to consider the future of Farnham Castle—that white elephant of episcopal housing.

Is it possible that the storied castle might be reclaimed for the people for this spiritual purpose of Working Men's Retreats? Or again, is it possible that some of our ancient abbeys, such as Glastonbury or Tintern in the south-west of England, Furness in the north-west, Bolton or Rievaulx or Fountains in the north-east, should be restored, not for the curious eyes of the sightseer, but for the practical service of religion; to be havens of refuge from the sombre oppressiveness or jarring strifes of the industrial system? Experience has often shown that the financial obstacles involved in all bold projects melt away when the call of the Spirit is unequivocal and plain. And the Church of England would have opened to the men and women of the new era fresh mansions of the Father's house, where they could turn aside for the training of the soul and the renewal of the vision of God.

But we must conclude. Speaking in the Encyclical letter of their appeal in connection with Reunion, the Bishops claim that it "is in idea and in method a new appeal."* The claim is one that might be justly made on behalf of the Conference's utterance as a whole. The mustard-seed sown in past generations by such pioneers of the faith as David Livingstone, George Augustus Selwyn, Henry Martyn, and Bishop Bompas has grown into the mighty tree whose branches overspread all the nations of earth. Their fearless obedience to the heavenly vision has borne its fruit in the penitence, the power, and the promise of the present Report. The authority which the Bishops have vindicated for the Church and for its chief Pastors is that which all Christian people most wished to see vindicated—the authority of the Spirit; and in their utterance we hear His voice, as the Jewish Church and people heard it from the lips of Jehoshaphat: "Deal courageously, and the Lord shall be with the good."

E. G. Selwyn.

* Report, p. 12.

RECENT WORK ON THE ATONEMENT

I.

The number of important books dealing with the doctrine of the Atonement from the point of view of historical exposition or constructive treatment, and, in more than one case, combining history and theory so as to bring out more fully the character of the writer's theology, has been a remarkable feature of British work in the field of Christian doctrine during recent years. It is something of a surprise: on the whole, the tendency of theological interest in the present century had been in the direction of the meaning of the Kingdom of God and of the fact and implications of the Incarnation. Nor had the trend of religious emphasis corrected this movement. In the Church of England, one great section of opinion laid the stress and weight of its appeal upon the Sacraments; another still maintained a certain undogmatic tradition and spirit which was more at home with the proclamation of the Fatherhood of God and the moral excellence of the teaching of Christ than with a systematized theology. And the latter standpoint had considerable support within English Nonconformity. There was a general reaction from the old-time concentrated emphasis upon soteriology. The hard, stark objectivity of the expiatory doctrine which had been the classical form in which the Protestant theologians had interpreted and expressed the idea of atonement seemed less ethically tolerable; there was a prevalent consciousness of the difficulty of isolating the work of Christ in His death from His life's work as a whole, and of the need for an appreciation of the Person of Christ which should give the notion of incarnation a standing in its own right, and not subordinate it to the passive endurance of suffering upon the Cross. To some extent this need merely reproduced the sense which the Protestant scholastics had of the necessity for finding a place for Christ's active, as well as for His passive, obedience; but the whole atmosphere was different from that in which Piscator and Gerhard, as quoted by Mr. Grensted in a book to which I shall refer more fully, could argue as to where the redemptive value of Christ's work was to be found. At the Universities there was the same story to tell: Westcott's powerful influence, his profound sense of the riches hid in the Person of Christ, of a gospel of creation resumed in the Incarnation and perfected in the Resurrection, inevitably reduced the significance of the death of Christ as a solitary saving act; while, at Oxford, the Lux Mundi school, though its starting-point was not

Westcott's (it was dogmatic and ecclesiastical, he biblical and speculative), nor its interests and aims the same, tended to find Christianity's religious and theological centre in the Incarnation itself, in "the taking of the manhood into God." One of the greatest of modern treatises on soteriology, *Atonement and Personality*, came from a member of this school, and nowhere has its most radical and characteristic conceptions been more thoroughly worked out. It marked an epoch; it revived interest in soteriology; all more recent developments come to a settlement with it in one way or other; but it was far from being a return to earlier views. It is quite true that Dr. Moberly goes back beyond Anselm to the Fathers, and finds help in Clement of Rome, Irenæus, and Athanasius, but for all that his construction is not a revival of patristic theology, but, at most, of one element which was never held in isolation.

Without exaggerating the extent of the change, a change there has been. The insistence on the Cross as the end of His ministry, regarded by Christ as inevitable, which was one feature in the eschatological reaction from the old liberal reading of the Gospels, had some effect; the continual urging of the expiatory element as the essential thing in the Cross, in a never-tiring stream of books and articles from about the years 1905 onwards, from the pen of Dr. Forsyth, was too remarkable—both provocative and stimulating—in character not to exercise a wide and strong influence; and the break with historic Christianity which could not be overlooked in certain restatements, which showed the working of the general liberal tradition, perhaps recalled more conservative theology and more classical piety to an appreciation of the relevance of the fact that the Cross, and nothing else, was the distinctive symbol of the Christian religion, that it was not sufficient to concentrate attention on Christ's Person and neglect His work. The Socinian controversy had a lesson here for those who knew the facts. In any case, while it is difficult to analyze adequately the causes and processes of the movement, there resulted a change in the balances and proportions of theological emphasis.

It may be asked whether the war has had its share in speeding this tendency. To some extent one may answer "Yes"; but in respect of aspects of the subject, rather than of the whole subject. The war compelled attention to the problem of the character of God's sympathy with the sufferings of man, and to the problem of theodicy—of the justification of God. Both these problems are vitally connected with the death of Christ, but whereas in the first of the two the naturalness of the connection (granted the Catholic doctrine of Christ's Person) does not lead directly to a doctrine of atonement, in the second the vital connection is not immediately

obvious; the referring of the justification of God to the Cross of Christ as to its one proper *locus revelationis* is a very striking instance of Dr. Forsyth's theological insight and power of subtle combination. More generally the war raised in an acute form the question of the whole character of Christian ethic, and any settlement reached or tendencies manifested with regard to this must, in the long run, affect the doctrine of the Atonement.

It is within the last four or five years that so much important work on the Atonement has been published; to it I wish now to turn. One series of articles, lately published, I have not read, except to a very small extent, and therefore must pass by. I refer to Dr. Robert Mackintosh's contributions to the *Expositor;* otherwise, I hope that nothing of the first importance is being overlooked. What is particularly interesting about the work in question is that it is representative of widely divergent, and of mediating, points of view; a survey of it will help us to see how widely is still being manifested the result of the fact that, as Dr. Headlam said in his inaugural lecture at Oxford, " there is no Catholic explanation of the Atonement."

The first book which I wish to mention is the volume of Moorhouse Lectures, published in 1916 by Canon Hart of St. Paul's Cathedral, Melbourne, under the title *Spiritual Sacrifice.** Canon Hart is concerned with the exploration and elucidation of the true character of worship, and, in particular, with the Eucharist. To that end he deals first with theories of sacrifice and atonement, and develops an attack upon the Western doctrine " of a meritorious self-sacrifice, placating or satisfying God by its intrinsic value." He rejects the whole idea of a reparation made by Christ as man. But the interesting point about Canon Hart's own view is that he does not relapse into Abelardian conceptions, but claims that his own view is the least subjective one possible, since the Atonement is for him a wholly divine work, effected by Christ when he was made man completely—not in Bethlehem, but on Calvary. Thus there is a resemblance—Canon Hart would say more—to that patristic view, notably present in Irenæus and Athanasius, which expresses itself in such a statement as " He was made man that we might be made divine." Canon Hart's position is not a little difficult of apprehension, because whereas, on the one hand, Christ's sacrifice is found to consist in His identification with human sin, no idea of expiation is allowed a place. There was nothing more to do when on the Cross, and finally by dying, Christ was made " very man." It is plain enough that this is a work altogether objective, altogether God's. But, at the same time, we come

* *Spiritual Sacrifice*, by John Stephen Hart, M.A., B.Sc. Longmans: 1916. 4s. 6d. net.

back, full circle, to one of the chief characteristics of all subjective views—that satisfaction and propitiation Godwards are ideas which have no place in a true doctrine of atonement. What is it that Christ does? is the decisive soteriological question. It is the question concerning not the Author of our salvation, that He was God, essential though this confession is, but the work which for our salvation He wrought. And in the answer to this lies, as I believe, the fundamental strength of the Western tradition.

This tradition is very lucidly exemplified in a quotation from another volume of the year 1916: Dr. Sparrow Simpson's *Reconciliation between God and Man.** He sums up the doctrine of reparation, which seems to him, unlike Canon Hart, an essential element in atonement, as follows: "Christ is God's greatest Gift to man. And when the Father gave us Christ, He furnished humanity with the means of making its own Godward reparation." The essence of this reparation is expressed in a way that recalls both McLeod Campbell and Moberly: in Christ the Father heard a new thing, "a human voice pronouncing perfect judgment on human sin; perfectly concurring in the judgment of the Father upon sin; gathering up, and fusing into one, and perfecting, all the earth's imperfect reparations; and offering a perfect sorrow for the sin of the world." Here is something very different in its notion of the situation created by sin, and of the need for a treatment of that settlement, than the bold conclusion which Canon Hart draws out as the results lying behind the theory of a ransom to Satan—"What did God do because of man's sin? In a very true sense He did nothing. He continued to carry out the purpose with which He had made the worlds." Only that purpose of union effected between man and God now meant that "the Son of God took to Himself the race of men—took us with our sin." I cannot but think that at this point Canon Hart is nearer to certain philosophical conceptions of the relationship between God and the world's evil than to the New Testament. One may not be content with Dr. Sparrow Simpson's emphasis upon the reparation made by humanity, and may be surprised at the confidence with which he can say that had Christ died a peaceful death at home "He would none the less have redeemed the world" (would there then have been the same strain on that obedience of His will which is the great internal action of the Cross?), but the substance of his thought has that Pauline quality which again and again—though it would not be fair to bring Canon Hart's volume into the comparison—makes the crucial difference between a theology at once evangelical and catholic and theological liberalism.

* *Reconciliation between God and Man*, by W. J. Sparrow Simpson, D.D. S.P.C.K.: 1916. 3s. net.

The year 1917 saw the issue of one notable work on soteriology, Dr. Denney's *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation.** Published after its author's death, it was a final offering to that truth which had been the most luminous and powerfully creative fact in his experience. There was a hardness about the grain of Dr. Denney's mind which it is impossible not to regret; he was not widely sympathetic, and he could be a drastically severe critic. But the presence of this element in his writings on the Atonement testified to his profound sense of the greatness of the work Christ had done, of all that it meant to him as a Christian believer, and of the need for a watchful jealousy, lest that which was the very centre and secret of the power of Christ's saving work should be hidden away or minimized in restatements of the doctrine.

His last volume is, however, so far as the first five chapters are concerned, more conciliatory in tone than any work of his with which I am acquainted. It is unfortunate that in the final chapter there is a reversion to the less pleasing characteristics of his temper. The fact is that Dr. Denney was extraordinarily out of sympathy with typical Catholic piety. The Incarnation, construed as "the taking up of human nature into union with a divine person," meant, it is fair to say, nothing to him at all. The whole theology of Christ's natures was alien to him. He says outright that the only thing he can understand by the Incarnation is "the actual historical life and death of Christ." He had no philosophy of the union of God and man in Christ, and did not feel the need of any: that is part of the fact that, as Dr. H. R. Mackintosh said of him, in an illuminating notice in the *Expository Times*, he had never settled accounts with philosophy. Inevitably, when he handles mysticism or the Sacraments, he reveals almost the dourest kind of Protestant reaction from every sort of conception of infused grace: he even thinks it desirable to say that the terms "consecrated or unconsecrated," used of the eucharistic elements, are "expressions totally destitute of New Testament authority"—all of which only goes to show that Dr. Denney's limitations, like all his other qualities, were strongly marked.

There is more of an historical survey in this volume than in earlier ones devoted to the doctrine of the Atonement. Broadly speaking, it shows that no particular system, neither Anselm's satisfaction theory, nor the Reformers' teaching of penal substitution, fully satisfied Dr. Denney. That thoroughgoing high Calvinist, Dr. B. B. Warfield, in his review of this book in the *Princeton Theological Review*, noted with regret a continuation of a tendency to Grotian theories (Christ's death as a penal example, but not rigorously

* *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation*, by James Denney, D.D. Hodder and Stoughton: 1917. 7s. 6d. net.

demanded by the righteousness of God) which he had previously observed in Dr. Denney: he missed the outspoken—

> In my place condemned He stood,
> Hallelujah !

It would probably be true to say that Dr. Denney grew less willing to affirm the theory of penal substitution in any precise formula. What one notices with great satisfaction in *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation* is the emphasis laid upon love. We might think that it was the exponent of a very different type of doctrine who speaks in such sentences as "Love proved itself in the Passion of Jesus to be the final reality, and no truth which takes possession of the heart of man can ever have power to subdue and reconcile like this"; or, of the demerits of Anselm's theory, "Perhaps the most conspicuous is that Anselm gives no prominence to the love of God as the source of the satisfaction for sin, or to the appeal which that love makes to the heart of sinful men"; or, and very strikingly, "The life of Jesus, from beginning to end, is in all its relations to others a life of love. It is love, then, we have to understand." The older theologians, in the line of descent from whom Dr. Denney has his place, would hardly have denied the truth of such utterances; but they would hardly have spoken in this way themselves. And most striking is his refusal to distinguish in justification between a *fides informis* and a *fides caritate formata*. A very real bridge is built between Catholic and Protestant conceptions, when the faith which unites the Christian with Christ is a faith "to which love is integral, because it is itself a response to a love which passes knowledge."

It must not be imagined that Dr. Denney has withdrawn in any way from his grasp of the objectivity, the Godward bearing, of the Atonement. He is convinced of the truth of the retributive view of punishment expressed in the fact of "the inevitable reactions of the divine order against evil." He will not surrender such words as "propitiation," "expiation," "substitution." His view of the New Testament perspective has not altered. But I think that a reader cherishing a different doctrine of the work of Christ would feel the atmosphere of the first five chapters less alien, and, one may perhaps say, less forbidding than *The Death of Christ*, and even *The Atonement and the Modern Mind*. Those who, like Canon Storr, were conscious of a profound debt to Dr. Denney for the first of these two earlier works, will feel that by this last volume that debt is increased.

Canon Storr's *The Problem of the Cross* (1919)* is an expansion of lectures. It is thorough, without being technical. I doubt whether

* *The Problem of the Cross*, by Vernon F. Storr, M.A. John Murray: 1919. 5s. net.

there exists any better book for putting into the hands of an inquirer who feels difficulties about the Atonement. Canon Storr is a philosopher, and there is some excuse for distrusting philosophers when they handle that great doctrine; there is the danger of something like a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος. But Canon Storr's approach to the subject has two great merits—he gives full weight to the New Testament teaching, and he emphasizes the reality of the moral order of the universe and the need for some reparation to it, since it has been violated by sin. With regard to this last point a word of comment may be in place. Here we are in the presence of one of the great dividing-lines in soteriological theory. It is impossible to prove that reparation for the violation of the moral order is necessary. It is, I believe, an ultimate deliverance of conscience, and can be neither analyzed, demonstrated, or refuted. The Christian conscience has, on the whole, tended to affirm the need, and still tends to affirm it. Canon Storr does not shrink from allowing a penal element in the Cross: Christ " entered into the doom of sin. He underwent what sin entails in the race "; and, with the idea of satisfaction rather than of penalty uppermost, " by His death Christ paid homage to the sanctity of the moral order." Canon Storr does not find the whole truth of the Atonement in such ideas; he accepts, following Moberly in linking together Calvary and Pentecost, a form of the representative theory; he accepts the " moral influence " theory as true, though not the whole truth, and makes the good point that the positive element in this theory is included in the substitutionary and representative theories when these are rightly expounded, which is, in effect, what we saw to be the case in Dr. Denney's emphasis on love. Finally, Canon Storr is specially suggestive in his extremely careful treatment of the subject of " the suffering God," and his interpretation of that idea through the Cross. It is, I am sure, only by our understanding of the Person and Passion of Christ that we can hope to understand the truth that there is in the notion of the suffering of God.

On a bigger scale than *The Problem of the Cross* is Mr. Snowden's *The Atonement and Ourselves*,* a book which shows that it may still be the proud and justifiable boast of the Church of England that it is not only to the Universities and to theologians in the narrower sense of the word that she has to look for good theology. There are two main thoughts which Mr. Snowden develops: the first shows him to be at one with Dr. Denney and Canon Storr in emphasizing the reality of the moral order of the universe, the necessity of reparation for sin, and the place of a penal element in the Cross. Indeed,

* *The Atonement and Ourselves*, by P. L. Snowden. S.P.C.K.: 1919. 10s. 6d. net.

Mr. Snowden goes beyond Dr. Denney in his emphasis upon the requirements which result from the nature of God. Dr. Denney has more to say of God's love than of God's holiness, though for him that love does not in the least render the whole substitutionary and penal view invalid, an assumption not uncommon among liberal theologians. Mr. Snowden deliberately subordinates love to holiness when he thinks of the Divine nature. Holiness is basal; love is a supreme quality: "though holiness is necessary to the very existence of love, love is only necessary to the completeness of holiness." One might be reading a lucid commentary on some characteristic passage of Dr. Forsyth's. And much as I sympathize with what is at the back of writing of this kind, I do not like what treats as a possible reality a God holy but not loving. Mr. Snowden is quite definite: "Holiness can exist as truth, purity, justice, etc., without love." But whether this is abstractly conceivable or not I object to any argument with regard to the God revealed in Christ being founded upon it; for there is nothing whatever to sanction the idea of a possible separation between holiness and love in that God.

The first main division of the book is, then, a considered argument for the need of an objective atonement, and for the fact of that atonement in the Passion of Jesus Christ, Who, while He did not endure punishment, yet endured suffering, which in itself possessed a penal quality. Mr. Snowden sides with Dale as against McLeod Campbell, Moberly, and others in refusing to put upon the cry from the Cross, "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" any other interpretation than that Christ did submit "to the awful suffering arising from 'the loss of the sense of God's presence.'" Certainly, if Mr. Snowden had laid down his pen at the end of Chapter III. of Part IV., no one could have had any real reason to doubt that he had affirmed, clearly and uncompromisingly, a doctrine of the Atonement derived, with practically no intrusion of alien elements, from the Reformers rather than from Anselm.

But with the second main division there comes a change. In one sense it seems a wholly legitimate change, for however objective the Atonement be, and, indeed, the more objective it is, the greater becomes the necessity for the expression of an intelligible relationship between Christ's work and ourselves. This was what Dr. Moberly felt so acutely: the Atonement must be vitalizing in man, and the key to this lay in Romans viii., whereas Dr. Dale appeared to him to have stopped with Romans vii. Nor was Dr. Denney unconscious of the need; all that he puts into the idea of faith, that "passion in which the whole being of man is caught up and abandoned unconditionally to the love revealed in the Saviour," is proof. But where Mr. Snowden's change ceases to be quite legitimate is in the

use he makes of the thought, to which he devotes great attention, of the identification of the Christian with Christ. One begins to realize that one is on a different road in the section headed *Christ's Crucifixion was only a Potential Atonement to be completed by and in each Believer;* there we learn that "only . . . the means were then [by our Lord's death] provided for atonement"; we are away from actual completed reparation; the reality has yet to come. The necessary *prius* to this is the identification of the Christian with Christ; the Incarnation is extended through a oneness effected between individuals and our Lord "by means of a union with Him as nearly identical in nature to this [the Incarnation] as possible," whereunto is directed the power of the Holy Ghost operating through the Sacraments. And so, because of the life of Christ in the Christian, and because the past fact of His crucifixion lives on in the Christian's present life, involving a real connection between the Christian and the sacrifice of Calvary, to which, moreover, the moral character of his life bears witness, Mr. Snowden comes to a conclusion as definite as, but how different from, any conclusion in the former main division: "It becomes clear it is not the suffering of the innocent, but of the guilty—not of Christ, but ourselves—which satisfies the claims of justice."

Now one need not share Dr. Denney's dislike of the phrase "mystical union," and of the ideas usually connoted thereby, to be convinced that a doctrine of identification amounting to the *unio mystica*, which leads anyone—and especially the writer of pages 1-189 of *The Atonement and Ourselves*—to frame a sentence like the above, wants resetting. The union of the Christian with Christ, interpret it as you will, and supplementing Dr. Denney's conception with something more mystical, is, in the New Testament, always the fruit of Calvary, and is related to Calvary in no other way whatsoever. When St. Paul said, "I am crucified with Christ," he did not mean that he had any share in Christ's work upon the Cross; immediately afterwards he speaks of the Son of God "who loved me and gave Himself for me," the logical *prius* to that experience which could be described as Christ living in him. It is perfectly true that the Christian's union is with the whole Christ, the Christ who has been crucified, not simply the Christ who now lives in glory, but that union does not involve such an interchange of characteristics between Christ and the Christian, or Christ and the whole Church, as would make of the Christian or the Church both Redeemer and redeemed.

It is impossible not to regret the second main division of Mr. Snowden's book. The author had a great purpose in view; after establishing the necessity for objective atonement, and keeping close to the New Testament in his exposition of the sufferings of

Christ, he desired to show that an intelligible relationship between Calvary and the new Christian life could be expressed. Unfortunately, he allowed, what Dr. Denney never allows, his grasp of what he already held to slacken; he left his moorings and went off into mysticism and speculation, into analogies psychological and sociological, without any proper biblical and moral control. The fault is a serious one, and it was not in any way inevitable. If I feel compelled to lay stress upon it, it is because there is so much that is strong and good in Mr. Snowden's book, and if only it had developed to the end on right lines it would have been a really notable piece of work.

Before turning to what, for various reasons, must be judged the outstanding volume in this whole series, something may be said on the two historical surveys, Principal Franks' very full record in two volumes, entitled, *A History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ,** and Mr. Grensted's *A Short History of the Doctrine of the Atonement* (1920).† In its thoroughness, Principal Franks' work in this particular field is comparable to Rivière's *Essai de l'Etude historique*—and the Englishman covers more ground; but the real comparison is with one of those massive German works which delight in showing how, beneath the surface of the history, certain principles or fundamental dogmatic impulses are at work leading to particular constructions and syntheses, which are destined to lose their solidity under the solvent action of other powerful forces which work towards new crystallizations. There is something of Harnack about the book, and something of Ritschl: it is considerably more than a record of successive doctrines of the Atonement; what is meant to appear at the various points of critical summing-up is the expression of a whole concept of Christianity in a dominant view of Christ's work. Where that concept cannot, in the author's opinion, be gathered simply from the formal doctrine of the work of Christ, he finds it necessary, for the sake of completeness, to expand his outlook so as to include doctrines of law and of the Sacraments. This is the case with the Western medieval dogmatic. The treatise is not easy reading, but there is a great deal in it which an English reader will look in vain for elsewhere. Mr. Grensted's *Short History* is less formidable. It is a straightforward account, with ample quotations, of the progress of thought on the Atonement. Constructive it is not intended to be, but no one (unless Principal Franks is an exception) can write a history of this doctrine without showing, more or less clearly, where he himself stands. Mr. Grensted holds

* *A History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ*, by Robert S. Franks, M.A., B.Litt. 2 vols. Hodder and Stoughton. 18s.

† *A Short History of the Doctrine of the Atonement*, by L. W. Grensted, M.A., B.D. Longmans, Green and Co., Publishers to the Manchester University Press: 1920. 9s. 6d.

to the objective theory in its satisfactionary form, with the influence of Moberly admitted but not obtruded. He is favourable to mystical conceptions of the union of the believer with Christ, but it is clear that he would be far more cautious and reserved in speculation than Mr. Snowden, far less likely even to mix up different stages in the objective work and the response to it. It is not a book that will help revolutionary spirits—which is not, in my opinion, a condemnation of it.

J. K. Mozley.

(*To be concluded.*)

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

We intend to publish next month an article from a well-known pen, which, though written almost entirely before the recent discussion on the Creation and Fall arose, yet has a close bearing upon it. To our mind the central issue of the controversy is not the scientific or historical accuracy of Genesis, but the question of the way in which people should think of the Bible. The view of those who would simply discard those parts of Holy Scripture which seem on the surface to conflict with modern knowledge seems to us frankly intolerable; for it implies that the Bible purports in all its parts to give us knowledge of the same kind as is arrived at by modern methods of research. That is an assumption which has no warrant beyond a certain amount of popular sentiment and tradition. The first fact to grasp is that the Bible—and the whole Bible—is the sacred literature of the Christian community, and is to be interpreted by reference to the mind and purpose of that community. The fundamental question to be asked, therefore, about any part of it is not, "Is this in agreement with the scientific textbooks?" but, "What are we, educated as we are in contemporary knowledge, to make of these chapters, or of those?" And the answers will be various: there are hymns and prayers, prophecies and exhortations, history and folklore, narrative and parable. The task of assigning the different parts of the Bible to their respective categories is one for students and scholars in the first instance, and in the next for clergy, parents, and teachers: it is what is meant, or at least covered, by St. Paul's phrase "rightly dividing the word of truth" (2 Tim. ii. 15). Such discrimination involves no danger to "the unity of truth," which is to be found in the unity of the One Spirit who reveals truth in many modes, rather than in any uniformity of epistemological method. If we may not distinguish history from parable, and value the second as much as the first, then the Good Samaritan will have to go the way of Adam and Eve. No doubt the simple alternative of the Bible or Science saves a good deal of trouble and thought; but we must insist that "spiritual things are spiritually discerned," and that those truths which it most concerns men to know about their destiny and present condition are to be found in the Scriptures rightly read, and found in the form best adapted under the circumstances to embody them.

CORRESPONDENCE

DICTIONARY OF LATER LATIN

Sir,

Having been honoured by the request of the S.P.C.K. to undertake the production of a Dictionary of Later Latin, covering the period from Suetonius to Bede, I should be very grateful for offers of assistance in reading and excerpting from any of your readers who may be interested in the study of late Latin, especially of the Fathers.

Yours faithfully,

(Rev.) J. H. Baxter.

King's College, Aberdeen.
August 28, 1920.

"THE PROBLEM OF REUNION"

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

REVEREND SIR,

In the otherwise very friendly review of my book, *The Problem of Reunion* (Longmans), which you publish in your pages, Fr. Wilfred Knox makes the following statements: "It is unfortunate that in considering historically the position of the Anglican Church Father Walker is content to accept the conventional account of the English Reformation given by historians of his own communion"; and again: "As a critic of Anglicanism he simply repeats a lesson he has learnt by heart without trying to investigate the truth." I have done no such thing. The essence of my claim is that the English Reformers—notably Cranmer—deliberately introduced ambiguity in order to get their measures accepted up to the moment when the Episcopate gave a conditional approval to the First Prayer-Book, but that from this moment onwards they proceeded to cut out the ambiguity, which had now served their purpose. Whence, I argue, the articles were not intended to be ambiguous, but to be a clear and consistent statement of the Anglican position, as Cranmer conceived it. This line of argument has never, so far as I know, been adduced before, yet Fr. Knox simply ignores it, and, instead, accuses me of repeating a lesson learnt by heart.

Secondly, my account of the Reformation is not based on "historians of my own communion," but exclusively on those of other communions, and for the most part on the History of the English Church published by Macmillan. If Fr. Knox will read Archdeacon Hutton's account of the Church of the Restoration, given in vol. vi., chap. 10, of that work, I do not think he will any longer have any reason to challenge my statement that it was the Parliament's demand for unfeigned assent and consent to the contents of the Prayer Book that led to the schism of 1662. Archdeacon Hutton gives a list of the reforms demanded at the Savoy Conference and elsewhere, but there is no word of any objection to ordination. Of the twelve hundred ministers who left their benefices on St. Bartholomew's Day many were not ordained and refused to be ordained, but I do not think that "the *main* reason of their secession was the demand that they should submit to such ordination." They preferred secession to ordination because Parliament refused them any concessions whatsoever in spite of the promises of the King. I regard the question of ordination as a minor point and so omit it, and in this I am at one with Archdeacon Hutton.

I do not give an "account" of Ridley's irreverence towards the Sacrament of the Altar. I merely mention the fact amongst others as illustrating the campaign to create strife as an excuse for further reform. The greater orthodoxy of Ridley's genuine views serves only to emphasize my claim that it was a deliberate campaign. Fr. Knox's assertion that "orders were scrupulously regulated in accordance with Catholic tradition" I frankly do not understand, in spite of the fact that I have read his pamphlet on the subject. I should like to add that I by no means wish to belittle the good work done by the Caroline divines, still less that now being done by the "Anglo-Catholic" party in the Anglican Church, for whose ideals and aspirations I have far more sympathy and respect than for those of Nonconformists, though I have tried to look at the problem of reunion also from their point of view. Plain speaking is necessary, but I am sorry

if mine has given offence. We should at least be friends, if we would pass from friendship to communion, and to promote such friendship is my earnest endeavour.

Faithfully yours in Christ,
LESLIE J. WALKER, S.J.

CAMPION HALL, OXFORD.
September 10, 1920.

"IN THE SPIRIT"

Dominus Illuminatio.

PSALM xlii. 7.

IN mystical thought depth is set over against depth: the depth of human life, spirit, love, on the one hand; and on the other the depth of Divine life, spirit, love. The human is finite, the Divine is infinite. But notwithstanding this disparity of degree they correspond the one to the other. The reason of their correspondence lies in the fact that man owes his being to an act of Divine love. Created in order that he might be perfected through participation in that love, he cannot be content with anything less than conformity to it. Any contentment which is less spiritual than this is but partial, illusory, as the individual realizes for himself in the day when something within him cries out for a satisfaction that is spiritual. It is the spirit crying from its depths—the deep is calling unto deep; the human is crying in its need for God. But in developing spiritual life it is the constant cry of the prayer of love. The love of the human spirit is deep beyond the ability of the mind to fathom; for in its origin it is Divine. The love of God is an abyss at which the highest created intelligence fails. But love ever turns to its source. And so the prayer of the saints, rising from their secret consciousness of what God is to them, whether it be of penitence or suffering, of longing desire or aspiration, or of ardent love, is a calling of "deep unto deep." And it is not ineffectual, for the soul by loving attains to love, and is immersed in it; and prayer is not an empty cry, but rather love that in its vehemence finds a voice. It is a voice that is answered by a voice. God from the deep of His own love calls to the soul of man, giving love that awakens within the human depths the longing that cries yet again. And so perpetually "deep calleth unto deep."

X.

Oremus.

[As was proposed last month, we devote the space below to the discovery of collects and prayers, whether old, or new, or both, that seem not unworthy to stand beside those of the Prayer-Book. This is an ambitious aim, but the failure of our own judgment in a hundred cases would be well counterbalanced by success in finding one. In any case, we hope that many of the prayers may be found useful in devotions, public or private.

The subjects for which, above all others, good collects are needed, are education, industry, social brotherhood, child life, and the sick.

Where contributions are not original work, the sources should be indicated. There are many old prayers, which only need retranslating or rewriting to give them new glory; and these we would welcome.

This month we select three seasonal collects, for Christmas, Epiphanytide, and Passion Sunday. Several other contributions have reached us, for which we are grateful; they are being carefully considered.]

A Christmas Collect.

Almighty and everlasting God, Who didst stoop to raise our fallen race by the childbearing of blessed Mary; grant that we who have seen Thy glory manifested in our manhood, and Thy love perfected in our weakness, may daily be renewed in Thine image and conformed to the likeness of Thy Son, Who liveth and reigneth with Thee and the Holy Ghost, ever one God, world without end.

Source: Gallican, Gelasian, and Mozarabic collects, translated by Bright, *Ancient Collects*, pp. 25, 26, 27.

An Epiphany Collect.

Almighty and everlasting God, Who didst illuminate the darkness of our night, and make known unto the Gentiles Him Who is the true Light and the bright and morning star; fill, we beseech Thee, the world with Thy glory, and in Thy splendour reign among the peoples; through the same Jesus Christ our Lord, Who, etc.

A retranslation of the Gregorian collect, Bright, p. 29.

A Collect for Passion Sunday (or at any time).

O Lord, Who hast ordained and crowned Thy people with a royal priesthood, Thyself the Great High Priest first reigning from the Tree; enthrone us also, we beseech Thee, by lives of constant love, and an humble service of others, that they and we together may go to possess that Temple and Kingdom where Thou with the Father and the Holy Ghost, one Sovereign God, reignest for ever and ever.

Original, suggested by Sermon LXXIII. of Donne.

The Word in Action.

Heroism. I.—The Battlefield.

"Greater love hath no man than this."—John xv. 13.

If war has done nothing else of spiritual value, it should have brought the heroism of the Cross back into its right place.

The ministry of Jesus Christ begins with *loyalty* under temptation, "For it is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him only shalt thou serve;" it ends with *heroism* in face of death, "Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray My Father . . . ? But how then shall the Scriptures be fulfilled, that thus it must be?" (Matt. xxvi. 53, 54.) First and last His appeal is to the Scriptures. He has His orders; it is the soldier spirit. A scout on the point of locating hidden forces of the enemy fell into their hands, and was imprisoned in an empty house between them and his friends. As they advanced he broke out with a cry of warning, and fell riddled with German bullets. Over his grave was written: "He saved others; himself he cannot save." What was a taunt on Calvary has in France become a superscription.

It is such misrepresentation of the Gospel as may easily arise out of

sacrificial language relating to the Atonement—*e.g.*, Isa. liii. 7—that has obscured the heroism of Jesus and turned many heroes from His allegiance. G. Bernard Shaw, in one of his scornful prefaces, long ago nicknamed this perversion "Crosstianity"; and now the Dean of Carlisle, in his Bampton Lectures, sets out to rectify tendencies of this kind in the sphere of theology.

But to return to the battlefield.

(1) It is important to keep heroism distinct from its recognition: "Vixere fortes ante Agamemnona." The many new decorations instituted since 1914 are admittedly inadequate as far as that goes. But it would be unfair to many officers and men to impute vainglory to their exploits in war. The first mark of heroism is *modesty*. "I only did what any man would have done under the circumstances."

(2) On the other hand, heroism does imply pre-eminence. To that extent the instinct for decoration is a true one. Heroism is obeying orders and something more, or, rather, the interpretation of orders so truly as almost upon occasion to disobey them in the letter. A mistake will be punished as disobedience, and the soldier who made no attempt to interpret his orders in the spirit will go unpunished. Which sounds hard, but shows that true heroism is courage plus judgment. It is a *moral quality*, the excess of responsibility over discipline. Consider the cases of General Dyer at Amritsar and of Colonel Kelly, who won a V.C. in France, but afterwards refused to obey what appeared to him to be foolhardy orders on the Archangel front.

(3) Heroism is born of *fellowship*. The hero may be single-handed, but he should never be lonely. A gaudy print, which is to be found on many a cottage wall, shows two British troopers in a sun-swept plain. On the horizon a cloud of dust marks the approach of fierce horsemen. Beside the two lies the one horse which has carried them thus far and dropped dead. One man (in blue) lies sorely wounded; his companion (in red) holds his hand in one of his and in the other a pistol, waiting for the end. The assumption is that the one horse might have carried the unwounded trooper to safety, and perhaps no one would have blamed him—at least, there would have been no punishment.

Heroism and loyalty are thus close akin. Read the awards in the *London Gazette* or *Court Circular*, and you will find generally that the exploit consisted in holding some vital point of communication or defence that *others* might serve in safety, or in leading those *others* when the time came for offence. The fellowship of Christ's sufferings was the widest of all.

(4) Then room must be found in heroism for *humour*. Grim humour sometimes. How the heroes taunt each other in the Iliad! How many great men have died with a jest on their lips! And to-day or yesterday there was "Ole Bill," or the U-boat crew who attended concerts at ——, on the East coast, and then posted a farewell appreciation to the bandmaster.

(5) But—and here many a good man must have been troubled where other good soldiers felt no check—is there room for guile in heroism? Must we honour Ulysses equally with Menelaus? To act a lie is doubtless braver than to lead a forlorn hope, because detection means heavier punishment in enemy hands. But are spying, lying, and mystery (as understood at sea) the regrettable necessities of even the best cause possible, or are they the acme of heroism? . . .

We turn to the O.T. and the heroes of the people of God; but *we* have known Christ. Can ψυχήν mean soul? Is that the supreme sacrifice—to be damned that my friend may live? Then God, who knows all hearts, will surely not condemn.

Y.

LAMBETH CONFERENCE REVIEWS

I.—THE BISHOPS AND REUNION: AN INTERPRETATION

The Lambeth Conference of 1920 will always be famous in the history of episcopal councils for two things: it was a council of penitent Bishops, not ashamed to confess their corporate guilt; and it was a council of leaders, not afraid to call their people to advance into an unknown land. Penitence is not a usual characteristic of prelates in synod. And Bishops are more apt to say *amen* to schemes that have already been widely accepted than to inaugurate great reforms on their own responsibility.

The Lambeth Bishops began their discussion of reunion with the frank and humble acknowledgment that, whoever else might be to blame, their own communion had a big share in the sin of disunion. They did not hide from themselves the plain fact that they had no moral right to claim a share in the spiritual glories of communions, episcopal or non-episcopal, which their forefathers had persecuted. Nor did they pretend that they had always been alive to the sinfulness of mutual separation. No. They began the discussion, as it were, on their knees in humble penitence; they pledged themselves to make amends; and they threw themselves upon the guidance of our Lord Jesus Christ, ready to follow Him wherever He should lead.

To men filled with such a spirit it gradually became evident that the only possible scheme of reunion was one that could command the support of the whole body of the Anglican episcopate. There were present in the Conference not a few Bishops who had already adopted one or other of the policies advocated in recent joint conferences of Anglicans and Free Churchmen. Some were even bent upon a formal recognition of non-episcopal ministries as on the same level as our own. On the other hand, there were a few who looked upon reunion as merely another name for universal submission to the Bishops. But this spirit of penitence so changed the great majority of those present as to make it possible for all to concentrate upon one scheme.

The appeal of the Bishops, with its resolutions, represents the Lambeth Conference as a whole. It says just what the whole body of Bishops can say with one voice. Some might have said more, some less; as a body, they have said, and they loyally mean, just this, neither more nor less.

Critics of the scheme have so far contented themselves with praising its spirit, and hinting at certain difficulties. Even so, they have begun to betray differences of interpretation for which we must be prepared. In this connection it is perhaps worth while to say that a scheme made by penitent men, anxious to save themselves and others from a state of sin, cannot be fairly interpreted except by

penitent men equally alive to the sin. If the appeal, with its resolutions, be read in the light of a bargain, it will have been misread. It has nothing to do with a bargain. It is a heartfelt acknowledgment that Christ wants something from us all, and a humble warning that what Christ wants from us must always cost us dear.

This said, and carried in our minds, we shall be better able to measure the Bishops' proposals.

The Bishops summon us to lift up our eyes to a new vision of the Church. Denominationalism is condemned. The spirit of separation is to be renounced. Anglicanism *as a model* is declared dead. The universal fellowship of the Catholic Church alone matters.

But since facts are facts, the Bishops throw all their influence on to the side of group-fellowship. Each communion of Christians that can respond to the claims of catholicity is to send its Bishops into the common councils of the whole fellowship, while itself forming a distinct autonomous group within the one, undivided Church. In order to accomplish this plan, each group must widen its vision of truth, put away merely local likes and dislikes, cease from denying its neighbours' affirmations, and learn to live in charity with groups that enshrine ideas very different from its own original notions of religion. Reunion, as the Bishops see it, presupposes a common faith, common Gospel Sacraments, and the common episcopal ministry. But also it takes for granted the possibility of wide, intelligent charity towards those whose deductions from the one faith are different from our own.

On this point we cannot lay too much stress at the outset. If it be assumed that any communion can become a group within the fellowship merely by sending its ministers to seek consecration to the episcopate or ordination to the priesthood, a great mistake is being made. That is not in the least what the Bishops intend. They desire a true reunion. They want men to admit that truth is bigger than any one mind or any one group of likeminded men. This admission makes group-fellowship possible. Without it, there can be no reunion at all, except in name. As the Bishops put it, we have all to learn loyalty to the universal Church, and show the charity and understanding which are required of the members of so inclusive a society (*cf.* Resolution 15). This can only mean that we are all to accept wholeheartedly the fundamental faith of Christianity, and have sympathy with those who see more in that faith than we do. For the fellowship the Bishops aim at will include "Roman" Catholic, "Orthodox" Catholic, "Anglican" Catholic, as well as those who are to-day members of non-episcopal communions.

Is this a possible intellectual position? Is it merely a vain dream? Or is it the case that we have at last made real to ourselves the catholicity we have for the last generation or two pretended

to have attained? There will be much searching of hearts on this point. It is a new idea to many. Men who boast themselves sincere in their beliefs may find it hard to allow other men to believe more or less than they themselves accept. And, certainly, those who believe least will have the hardest task. One whose notions of the presence of Christ in the Sacrament of Holy Communion are quite general may not find it easy to be sympathetic with High Mass and Benediction. And a man who has a clear-cut definition of all seven Sacraments will be hard put to it if he is to sympathize with a group that is content with very general explanations of less than seven. Nevertheless, the Bishops are convinced that it is possible and eminently desirable. We are forbidden to deny what the universal Church allows. At the most we may say: "I have not yet seen my way to understanding that." We are equally forbidden to demand more as necessary to salvation than the Apostles themselves implicitly required.

So with regard to the common ministry. The Bishops in their appeal have spoken very tenderly about episcopacy. They imply its meaning rather than assert it. None the less, it is plain that they do attach to it a very real content, as, for example, a pledge of unity and continuity, a symbol of fatherhood in God, and an Apostolic authority to minister Confirmation and preside at the universal Eucharist. It is a mistake to think of the Bishops as recommending a magic rite of ordination to men who think it cannot make any difference to them. The whole point of the Bishops' argument is that episcopal ordination will open the door not only to a universal ministry but to the one, two-thousand-year-old, Apostolic ministry. That this is so the appeal evidently suggests, while Resolution 12 (B) (ii.) definitely makes it clear.

It is, however, entirely true that the Bishops have not asked our non-episcopal brethren to give assent to any one definition of Apostolical succession. There is a good deal of confusion in men's minds between acceptance of the fact of episcopal succession, with all its implications of unity, continuity, and the like, and theories of the exact effect of the grace of consecration. The Bishops have, wisely and fairly, confined themselves to the fact of the succession. A man who cannot, in general, accept its significance has no right to submit to consecration or ordination. But a man who can accept its significance for the Church's unity and continuity, and acknowledge the universal authority he thereby acquires, is quite justified in receiving consecration. No one has the right to ask him whether his view of the Sacrament of Orders is Cardinal Manning's or Dr. Gore's or Dr. Headlam's.

It is much to be hoped that no one will attempt to upset the balance of the Bishops' statement on this vexed question. To say

that a man who thinks episcopacy a matter of no moment may, under the Lambeth scheme, accept ordination or consecration is as wrong as to say that he cannot be ordained until he conforms with Cardinal Manning's standard of values.

We pass now to consider the situation that will be set up if and when the suggested group be formed within the fellowship. What exactly will the position be ? Briefly, each group will keep its own customs, only modifying them where loyalty to the one fellowship demands it.

The link of organic unity between group and group will be the Bishops. They will meet in one common synod in each diocese, they will act together in matters that concern all the groups together, and they will be jointly responsible for all consecrations to the episcopate.

Within any one group the Bishops will be independent of Bishops of other groups. And their relation to their own group organization will be settled within the group itself. Again, each group will settle its own mode of worship, provided that its sacramental *formulæ* be acceptable in all groups. There must be a *minimum* form, adequate to assure visitors from other groups of the regularity and validity of the sacramental act. This safeguarded, the remainder of the service can be determined freely by the group itself. It can even be left to the officiating minister.

No just objection can be raised against this suggestion. If the fellowship is to be really one, intercommunion on occasions must be free to all. And therefore we must all have regard to one another's consciences. Loyalty to the universal Church will help us all to arrive at what is necessary to ensure peaceful intercommunion. Of course, no one will wish that communicants of one group should often receive Communion in another. Such a habit would cause endless confusion to the two congregations concerned. But since, of course, intercommunion when necessary must be quite free, there must be a recognized form such as will satisfy all who come.

We turn now to the question of recognition of ministries.

It is not true that the Bishops have proposed " reciprocity of ordination." What is true is that they have determined to defer to other men's consciences, and to ask for themselves a deliberate welcome in the other groups of the fellowship.

The Bishops have complete confidence in their own position as Catholic Bishops. They have no kind of doubt about their authority everywhere within the universal Church. But they are aware that some groups may not feel quite as sure ! Also, they are conscious that the antagonism between Anglican and others during the past three hundred years deprives them of any just claim to a personal share in the past glories of the other groups. They cannot claim to

share the victories of confessors and martyrs their own Queen Elizabeth or their own King Charles persecuted! Yet they want their share. Moreover, they desire the Anglican communion to be so entirely forgiven as to make them welcome within the other groups, both as fellow-Churchmen and as occasional ministers. How can all this they desire be better accomplished than by some formal recognition, with a commission to minister on occasions within the group?

This is their proposal. And they leave it entirely to the other groups to determine what form the recognition shall take.

Of course, they make it quite clear that they cannot repudiate their past ministry as Catholic Bishops.

They also lay great stress on the fact that, in calling upon their non-episcopal brethren to accept episcopal ordination, they ask no man of any group to repudiate his past ministry or belittle the many blessings that God has sent thereby to himself and to others.

Could anything be said more fair, more humble, or more charitable than this? The Bishops have indeed set a great example to Christendom. They have yielded no principle; they have claimed no rights or privileges; they are ready to take the first step towards reconciliation.

But is their appeal likely to effect much?

Mr. F. B. Meyer sounded a chilling note the very day it was published, laying stress upon the difficulty of ordination. And he has not been alone.

Now it is entirely evident that we here have a very real difficulty that cannot be overcome merely by good feeling. None the less, there is every ground for hopefulness. We must be patient. We must avoid controversy. And we must say our prayers.

That the Bishops do expect a response to their appeal before the next Conference is shown by two resolutions they have passed dealing with what may be called an "interim" period.

Assuming that some leading ministers will respond, and set to work to influence their own communions in favour of the appeal, the Bishops desire such men to be regarded as eligible to occupy our pulpits on special occasions. Thus a man who is prepared for reunion at the cost of being ordained episcopally, and who is held back for a time until his own communion will as a whole follow him, is to be placed on our list of eligible preachers [Resolution 12 (A) (i.)].

Again, assuming that a congregation or a whole communion accepts the appeal and begins quite definite negotiations for reunion, the Bishops will not insist upon completion of negotiations before receiving its members to occasional Communion. Thus do they show their eagerness to welcome into the fellowship all who are ready to come [Resolution 12 (A) (ii.)].

Such, then, is the corporate mind of the Lambeth Conference; such is its appeal.

It is impossible to think that it will fail. Even if it evoke no effective response from men of the Bishops' generation, it cannot fail to stir the hearts and imaginations of the younger men and women. For us Bishops it may prove that God has shown us only His work; the vision of His glory in a reunited Christendom may well await those who come after us. We are, in that case, more than thankful if we have been permitted to do the Master's work!

FRANK ZANZIBAR.

II. A FREE CHURCH VIEW

It may be said at once that the Report of the Lambeth Conference puts the whole question of reunion on a new footing. It can no longer be regarded as the hobby of a few enthusiasts. It is now a living concern of all the Churches, and well within the range of practical politics. As one who has been deeply interested in the question for many years, I cannot but regard the Lambeth decisions with the deepest thankfulness, as the evident work of the Spirit of God. Though I can speak only for myself, I hope and believe that they will be generally welcomed by Nonconformists, and given that close and prayerful consideration which they surely deserve.

The Bishops rightly claim that their treatment of the subject represents a new point of view. This is nowhere more apparent than in the spirit in which the whole matter is discussed, and in the attitude taken up to Christians of other communions. It is hardly too much to say that if this spirit and attitude become characteristic of Anglicanism in the future, the whole face of British Christianity will be changed. The acknowledgment of baptized Christians of other Churches, as sharing with Anglicans "membership in the universal Church of Christ;" the approach to them from the standpoint not of dominance, but of fellowship; the proposal to confer with the authorities of other Churches in a common endeavour after unity; and the abandonment of the ideal of a rigid uniformity in favour of a "right use of diversity"—all these represent a point of view which is as remarkable as it is gratifying. It is to be feared, however, that the Bishops are very much in advance of the rank and file of their clergy. Nothing would help the cause of Christian union more than a readjustment of the relations between Church and Dissent, especially in country districts, in accordance with the spirit of the Lambeth Report. On our side, I feel sure that one result of the Conference will be a diminution of that more or less veiled antagonism to the Anglican Church which is still to be found in many Nonconformist circles.

There are at least two points in the Bishops' appeal on which Nonconformists will need further discussion and information. The first relates to the requirement of a " wholehearted acceptance " of the creeds as a condition of unity. Many Nonconformists have a rooted objection to anything in the nature of credal tests, and history has surely justified their position in this regard. It is not that they do not believe the doctrines which the creeds embody. They are jealous of the liberty of interpretation, and they do not consider it to be right to tie men down to exact verbal statements which, however consecrated by long usage, are not sufficient for the intellectual needs of the present day. If what is required is a wholehearted acceptance of the main doctrines of the Christian faith set forth in the creeds, there will be no real difficulty, but farther than this many will not be prepared to go. That there is really no fundamental difference between the doctrinal position of Anglicans and Nonconformists has been abundantly shown in various conferences which have taken place, and notably in the first interim report of the Committee on Faith and Order, where the results of a genuine agreement on matters of faith are set down.

The next point on which further light will need to be sought is in regard to the acceptance of " a commission through episcopal ordination " by Nonconformist ministers. The larger Free Church denominations willingly give authorization to accredited ministers of other denominations to officiate in their churches, and the same authorization or commission will very gladly be given to Anglican clergy. If, then, the " commission through episcopal ordination " may be regarded as an extension to Anglican Churches of a ministerial commission already received and exercised elsewhere, again there will not be very much difficulty. But it will need to be made very clear in the form of ordination service that it is such an extension of commission that is contemplated and not reordination *de novo*. The language of the Lambeth resolutions certainly seems to point in the direction of this extension of commission, and the situation will be still further eased for many by the suggestions on p. 143 of the Report for recognizing in the reunited Church ministers who may not have obtained episcopal ordination. There is no doubt that this Lambeth Conference, as compared with the previous one, has put the question of episcopacy on a new footing, and one which makes the discussion of it from the Nonconformist point of view more possible, and more likely to be fruitful. In effect it has removed the question of episcopacy from the region of faith to that of order. On these terms, Nonconformists will not be indisposed to consider it, especially in the more primitive and constitutional form that is suggested.

There is yet another point to which the Lambeth resolutions make no reference on which Nonconformists will need to be reas-

sured—viz., the question as to relation between the reunited Church and the State. For many of us union with an Established Church is unthinkable, and even on the Anglican side the Establishment is felt to be a real obstacle in the way of those better relations which are the first condition of any measure of reunion. The difficulty is a very serious one, and I mention it now, not in order to anticipate trouble, but because it is one of those outstanding facts that will need to be faced from the very first.

The recommendations of the Conference that the authorities of the Anglican Church should invite other Churches to consider with them the possibility of taking definite steps towards reunion, and to form representative councils for united social and moral action, will be very warmly welcomed. A great deal yet remains to be done on both sides before the ideal of a reunited Church can be either understood or appreciated by the rank and file in the Churches. Most Christian people have yet to be educated up to it. There are many old prejudices that need to be overcome and much ignorance to be enlightened. This can only be done gradually, and with patience. Members of different communions need to get to know one another better and to learn how much they already have in common. The best means to this end is co-operation in various forms of social, philanthropic, and religious service, and the Lambeth Report should give a real impetus to the various efforts in this direction which have already been initiated. There is a great field open here for all Christians of goodwill. If men will but become accustomed to work and pray together, a better mutual understanding is sure to follow, and the way will then be open for a closer and more effective union. The abandonment of all ideas of absorption is important in this connection. All the great Nonconformist bodies are conscious of a characteristic witness of their own, which time has not yet staled. The ideal of union will appeal to them much more strongly as they come to understand that there will remain room and scope for their distinctive witness, and that they will not be expected to lose their identity in any reunited Church. This the Lambeth Conference makes very clear, and the effect of it will be all to the good.

It now remains for the authorities of all the Churches to take up the challenge which the Bishops have thrown down. If this is done in the fair and brotherly spirit which the Conference itself has so abundantly shown, we may hope immediately for much better relations between all the Churches, and ultimately for a measure of reunion which will end the scandal of our unhappy divisions, and make for a more effective, because undivided, witness and mission to the world.

W. B. Selbie.

NOTICES

THE LOLLARD BIBLE AND OTHER MEDIEVAL BIBLICAL VERSIONS. By Margaret Deanesly, M.A. Cambridge: At the University Press. 1920. 31s. 6d. net. [In *Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought*, edited by G. G. Coulton, M.A.]

"Myself have seen," said Sir Thomas More, "and can show you, Bibles fair and old written in English, which have been known and seen by the Bishop of the diocese, and left in laymen's hands, and women's, to such as he knew for good and Catholic folk." What were these Bibles that More had seen? Were they Wyclif's, or was there an approved orthodox translation? Is there any truth in the Protestant tradition that Wyclif first translated the Bible into English, and that the Church forbade the use of all vernacular versions before the Reformation? This tradition, once commonly held, has lately suffered some modification. Cardinal Gasquet has argued that the medieval Church opposed translations less than was represented, and that there was an authorized English version. Wyclif, the translator, the social reformer, the democratic evangelist, has receded into the background, and there has remained only a dim Oxford schoolman whose influence upon Bible translation is difficult to define. One version inspired by him there seemed to be, but was it not one among others?

To bring to the acid test of documentary evidence the confused (if pleasing) theory of an "old English Bible," Miss Deanesly has examined the problem of Bible reading in the Latin Church at the end of the Middle Ages. She devotes some chapters to France, Italy, Spain, the Empire, and the Netherlands, determining the severity of official prohibitions, the popularity of heretical versions, and the growing desire for translations among the orthodox. Next Miss Deanesly tries to measure the amount of Bible reading in pre-Wyclifite England. Some admirable chapters examine the Biblical knowledge of the prelates, the monks, the friars, and the parish priests. The ground thus cleared, we face the central problem of Wyclif's Bible: its versions, its glosses, the controversy, and the condemnation in 1408. The other contemporary versions, it is maintained, bear marks of Wyclif's influence, and he may be called the instigator of them. The last chapters argue that there was no encouragement and little sanction for vernacular Bible reading until the eve of the Reformation; that such English versions as were in orthodox hands must have been Lollard by origin, since no non-Lollard translation was undertaken; and that wherever Lollardy persisted we have the strongest ground for believing that Bible reading also persisted.

Miss Deanesly's book confirms the conservative theory: vernacular Bibles, though not utterly and without exception banned, were in practice suspected and discouraged. Wyclif himself may have had little part in the actual translating, but other translations than the so-called Wyclif's Bible were the result of the movement that he provoked. Miss Deanesly bids us think of this as a movement not confined to Lollardy, but affecting many priests who remained within the Church. In the long and valuable appendix of documents the most interesting is the tract *The Holi Prophete Dauid Seith*, written probably by Wyclif in defence of translations before the actual work began.

The Lollard Bible is a splendid monument of industry and exact scholarship. The evidence examined is enormous, and everywhere we can tell what is fact and what is inference. Apart from its general thesis, it contains excellent accounts of many medieval books, and it will serve well,

we think, as a reference book. But though Miss Deanesly is so competent an instructor and has so much to tell us, we complain a little about her manner of telling it. She makes too little concession to our interest in the people about whom she speaks. It is admirable to proclaim "certainties as certain, falsehoods as false, and uncertainties as dubious" (why not as "uncertain"?), but that is not the whole duty of the historian. There is colour, and movement too. History is not still life, and our chief criticism of Miss Deanesly's book is that sometimes it almost leaves us with that impression.

B. MANNING.

THE OLD-TIME PARSON. By P. H. Ditchfield, F.S.A., F.R.H.S. London: Methuen and Co. 1920.

This is a most entertaining and instructive book. It begins, suitably enough, with a justification of the good old English word "parson," the *persona* or chief person in the parish, as defining more clearly than either Rector or Vicar the status of the Anglican priest, and it gives a series of different types of clergymen as shown in original records or contemporary literature from medieval times to the present day.

As Mr. Ditchfield points out, our literature is rich in character studies of the English clergy, many of these being probably drawn from life, and surely the best are incomparable.

Chaucer's "poor parson of a town" is quite the most charming character of that little band of worthies who travelled to the tomb of the holy blissful martyr at Canterbury. Sir Roger's excellent chaplain, Abraham Adams, and Dr. Harrison compare favourably with other men of their times, while we are justly proud of countrymen like the good old parson of the "Deserted Village," well-beloved of children, passing rich on forty pounds a year, and the immortal Vicar, with his kindly tolerance and inimitable humour. Again, in a later age, Mr. Gilfil and Amos Barton are worthy examples of their order. All these, and many others, are brought together in these pages, and by judicious quotations the reader is induced to obtain first-hand knowledge of them.

Moreover, stories of all the varying members of the clerical hierarchy abound; anecdotes of the eccentric parson, the hunting parson, the parson in his relation to his clerk, his parishioners, his superior officers—the Archdeacon and the Bishop—enliven the whole book.

The Bishop as having risen from the status of parson also appears, and there are notable examples of Bishops' wit and tact which would make any nation less self-critical than the English quite inordinately proud of its gift of humour.

A short summary of the work of the English Bishops from Swithin and Dunstan onwards gives evidence of wide reading; we may hope that the author will lengthen it at some future time into a separate book.

In his account of the Elizabethan parson, Mr. Ditchfield gives useful information on the lay-impropriation of tithes, a subject which should be better known to the general public than is the case at present. One of the criticisms which may justly be levied against Church people is the presence among them of lay rectors. The very term is one of reproach, and if the history of the whole transaction were more generally known, the restoration of its long-lost property to the Church might follow.

Mr. Ditchfield severely denounces Macaulay's description of the status of the clergy in Stuart times, but at the present day no one reads Macaulay as a serious historian, though as a picturesque writer he can hardly be surpassed. With regard to the social position of the English parson, our lack of any standard domestic history of our race places us at a disad-

vantage. Perhaps the standing of the clergyman in all ages has been what each individual achieves for himself, since our national Church, to its honour, has ever been democratic. No one was much poorer than Chaucer's parson, yet to the poet, and to all his later readers, he was a more satisfactory character than the rich monk with his fur-lined coat and his epicurean tastes. It is quite clear that the Reformation clergy were inordinately poor, since what was sufficient for a celibate priest was utterly inadequate for a married clergyman with a family in times when the value of money had decreased, and, as the author remarks, "clerical poverty has produced many evils," the best-known example being the trencher-chaplain, whose treatment by his patrons was a degradation of religion. Doubtless some literature of this period exaggerated the type, but the poet Crabbe shows that the office was a difficult and humiliating one.

Nevertheless, no class of men have figured more frequently in literature, and when we do find our social historian, it will probably be seen that the parson has exercised his influence over almost every phase of our national life.

We learn incidentally in Mr. Ditchfield's book much about those clerical terms and customs which should be, but so seldom are, part of the common knowledge of Church-people—when we should use the "Very Reverend" or the "Right Reverend"; what is the difference between the Rural Dean and Mr. Dean; the origin and duties of the sidesman, the Canon, the Archdeacon, in which connection reappears that old chestnut about "archidiaconal functions." There is a delightful story about Canon Parkinson, illustrating that wide tolerance which is so typical of Englishmen. Dean Herbert of Manchester was rather fond of inveighing against the teaching of the Fathers. His views diverged from those of the learned Canon, and upon one occasion the Dean administered a severe philippic upon Tertullian. Canon Parkinson was annoyed, but he only remarked "Well, Mr. Dean, Betty Jones [an old woman who was a regular worshipper at the Collegiate Church] will never care to read Tertullian again after your attack and exposure of his character."

But the book abounds in good stories, and the humour is always genial and kindly. It has recently been issued in a cheap edition by Messrs. Methuen, and is thus brought within the reach of everyone interested in quaint old customs now passing away, and in those personal anecdotes which tend to give reality and humanity to the dignitaries of our Church, whether of high or low degree.

ELEANOR TROTTER.

WHAT RELIGION IS. By Bernard Bosanquet, D.C.L., LL.D., Fellow of the British Academy. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited. 1920. Pp. xii, 81. Price 3s. 6d.

"Dr. Bosanquet never, like Mr. Bradley, falls foul of the Christian pulpit in heated language. But that is precisely because he has not a religion of his own, not one which is a vital interest." So wrote Professor A. E. Taylor in the first number of this review. In this short book Dr. Bosanquet certainly claims to possess a religion, and one feels as one reads it that Professor Taylor's words are not quite fair. It is not the work of "a curious observer from the outside"; there is even a subdued fire in Dr. Bosanquet that gives vitality to the central grasp by the mind and will on the supreme values. The categorical character of truth, love, and beauty as ideals for faith to be followed with supreme disinterestedness, and the conviction that our present imperfection is not the reality of ourselves, but that we can enter into union with the supreme good and "rise

into another world while remaining here," are based on the depths of experience. As the writer deals with that experience he gives us assuredly something warm and vital. But the warmth is chilled by self-imposed limitations. The religion of Dr. Bosanquet knows nothing more definite for its object than " the supreme good "; predicates like Father, Creator, King, and Lord are expressly ruled out as accidental, and indeed likely to lead the soul astray from union with the true Eternal, with whom our highest values are associated. This seems to be the point of attack upon Dr. Bosanquet's conception of religion. " When faith weakens, the unity of the spirit tends to sever itself into ideas of persons in relation with each other, and the common conceptions of persons begin to react," he writes, and exposes a point of view that is scarcely comprehensible to the Christian thinker. For the predicates which Dr. Bosanquet so airily rejects as " words which may help our sluggish imaginations " are precisely what makes religion real to the Christian, whatever element of symbolism he may recognize in the terms. Christianity is, indeed, the revelation of God as personal, and the personal predicates rejected by Dr. Bosanquet are practically what we mean by religion. It is that very stress on the intimate personal relations between God and man which is central for Christianity. Prayer and Sacraments in our religion are not subjective " means to renew and fortify faith," but actual communion of person with person.

A religion very like Dr. Bosanquet's ruled the thinkers of the Western world when Christianity arose. Like the Stoic, he finds the supreme values within, he extends them to the Eternal without, he makes earthly circumstances indifferent, so long as unity with the world-spirit is attained. Stoicism was a magnificent religion, but it fell before Christianity as surely as the pagan cults. Or rather the larger truth absorbed the lesser, because it passionately held those personal predicates which Dr. Bosanquet considers likely to lead the soul astray.

W. J. Ferrar.

Introduction to the Study of Russian History. By W. F. Reddaway, Censor of Fitzwilliam Hall, Cambridge. No. 25 of the series " Helps for Students of History." London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1920. Pp. 32.

The greatest credit is due to the author of this useful booklet for the zeal with which he succeeded in collecting and sifting a great deal of the available material that may help the beginner to gain an interest and an adequate insight, not only into " the strangeness of Russia's expansions, contractions, and transformations," but also into the " widely different contents of her history, with matters unknown or even unintelligible " to the ordinary historians (p. 4). Dealing in a general survey with the " outlines " of Russia's history, her language, the periods of her development and her literature (§§ 1, 2, 4, and 5), Mr. Reddaway, in the section on " Method," insists upon " the advice to feel keenly before attempting to know systematically " (p. 22), quite in accordance with his view of the " central mystery of the study—the racial character of the Slavs " (p. 18). This formula, of course, cannot be taken literally, Russians and Slavs being by no means identical conceptions. It is to be regretted that the selection of authorities is bibliographically incomplete, lacking dates of publication; otherwise the beginner will no doubt have the full benefit of Mr. Reddaway's sobriety and soundness of judgment, especially if he remembers the paramount importance of the right methods and discipline, which will help him to recognize the minor masters, whom the author, in a mood of generous appreciation, has considered it unfair to omit.

SELECT PASSAGES ILLUSTRATING COMMERCIAL AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND RUSSIA. By A. Weiner, M.A., F.R.Hist.S., Lecturer in History, King's College, University of London. Texts for Students, No. 17. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. 1920. Pp. 76.

The concluding remark of the preceding note on Mr. Reddaway's "Help" applies fully to the brief bibliography annexed to Mr. Weiner's book containing works written for the "general reader," and therefore not sufficiently accurate to be connected with the scientifically important selection of texts, covering a period of 350 years of Anglo-Russian commercial and diplomatic relations. Short notes by Mr. Weiner will help the student to understand the historical importance of the texts drawn from official sources and other publications.

In its completeness, Mr. Weiner's selection offers a very accurate picture of the development of the intercourse between both nations, with its alternations of peace and war intermingled with episodes of tension. An attentive study of these texts will prove most useful. An attempt to make a more complete bibliography of English books on Russia would show that many valuable books deserve a fuller consideration, while others, pushed into the book-market, ought not to figure in lists of authorities at all.

A. MEYENDORFF.

THE TEACHING OF THE TWELVE APOSTLES. Edited by T. W. Crafer, D.D., Incumbent of St. Germain's, Blackheath; Warden of the College of Greyladies. Texts for Students, No. 13. London: S.P.C.K. 1920. Pp. 15. Price 4d. net.

THE EPISTLE OF BARNABAS. Edited by T. W. Crafer, D.D. Texts for Students, No. 14. London: S.P.C.K., 1920. Pp. 32. Price 6d. net.

The S.P.C.K., not content with supplying the student with a valuable series of "Translations of Early Documents," is now publishing a series of original texts in convenient form at a cheap price. The two received, both edited by Dr. Crafer, in no way fall short of the high standard of excellence we have come to look for in the Society's publications. In each case the text of the edition is reprinted from that adopted by Bishop Lightfoot in his *Apostolic Fathers*, and is prefaced by six or seven pages of "Introduction," in which the contents are summarized, the sources enumerated, and the various problems connected with the books indicated. It is obvious that the character of the series forbids anything more than a very brief discussion of controversial topics, and Dr. Crafer is to be congratulated on the amount of information he has succeeded in compressing into so small a compass. It is, perhaps, a matter for regret that space could not be found for fuller information as to the literature on the subjects in question than is provided in the occasional footnote. Such an addition would have increased very greatly the value of these texts to the student.

B. T. D. SMITH.

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